Monday, October 06, 2008

Portfolio Management Ashoura

I just finished reading the Sept monthly letters from TPG, Greenlight, Cerberus and Tontine on Deal Breaker (thanks to Greg Newton at Naked Shorts). Pease forgive my feelings of deja-vu, for not only have I seen it before, but I've even scripted it for them.

Inside, there is lots of blame shoveled around - mostly upon desperation or foolishness of others, the market environment, the seeming unprecedentedness of it all, along with small dose of mea culpa for not doing better. Then, there is the wrapping of their culpability under a cloak of relative performance - since inception, vs. Chinese stock indices, vs. peers, even vs. the returns of the Calumet Auxiliary Women's On-Line Investment club - as if repeating a mantra (any mantra) justifying one's longer-term self-worth will wash away the sins of losing 60% of investor equity in heartbeat on a portfolio of very concentrated, super-high beta, massively correlated bets, or with hindsight, to forlornly validate the decision to go "all-in" (yet again) on black following sixteen quarters of "blacks". Aw shucks, it was "red", sorry...

There is little mention of the wisdom of the Hedge Fund Model of using serendipitous momentum-correlated equity to borrow stochastically-available credit, shoulder the burdens of complete counterparty-risk to access the leverage, in order to pile into crowded trades for which there is little exit until after the embers have finished smouldering. Nor is there much mention of why they were willing to bet everything that this wasn't the big one when the tide had rather obviously begun washing out a year a go, the chain of events unfolding had been in one direction only, and the weather wane of liquidity, growth, and sustainability was pointing south. There wasn't even a grown-up sober attempt call a spade "a spade" to say something like you just don't get 100% returns on the upside without risking near-total annihilation on the fat negative tail. This of course was not addressed.

But now we are a week into October. And another 10+ percent down. And another set of crowded trades is being liquididated. No, this cannot be good. This is unlikely to repair damage done in September. Or validate one's assessment of unimaginable values. Indeed, these moves look terminal to those that wore them.

I am naturally suspicious of mis-guided or disingenuous self-flagellation such as that depicted in the inset photo above. This spate of letters strikes me as a form of "portfolio management ashoura", a rehearsed and stylized self-flagellation that misses the point and many of the lessons wrought by the event itself.

Wednesday, October 01, 2008

Sam Zell is a God ! (well, almost...)

I do not know Sam Zell. And I cannot tell you whether or not he is a nice man, charitable or selfish. He looks warm, fuzzy, and indeed almost grandfatherly in many of his photographic depictions (see left). What I can tell you is that his decision to sell his real estate behemoth, Equity Office Properties (Fmr Ticker: EOP) in November 2006 (closing in Feb 2007) was the epitome of counter-trend prescience, bucking the prevailing crowd by unloading at supremely elevated valuations on the offer-side of the market to buyers who were apparently more flush with cash and agency zeal than foresight. BANG! went the gavel! YOURS!!! (for $34 billion $102 million 305 thousand dollars thankyouverymuch).

By comparison, the chart below shows the fate of Manhattan Class-1 Office REIT SL Green & Co (Ticker SLG) and it isn't a pretty site. Not that SLG's earnings estimates have deviated much from what they were. Oh no. This is about ratings compression, and the (probable and correct) wisdom of the market (and thus price) running roughshod over the innovation of sparse earning information.

Most portfolio managers, investors, traders and fence-swinging hedgies aspire to "tagging it" just so, wearing it as a badge of honor for the rest of one's life, like Nils Taube in 1987. Even those of us who are more comfortable and adept at playing percentages, cannot help but admire such exemplary market-timing perfection, the flip-side of the horror we (or at least yours truly) would view the late-cycle OTT dismemberment of ABN.

So today, Sam Zell, when the best in the business (ahem, except for John Paulson) are recipients of the ego-cleansing of-a-lifetime, and all market participants are in need of something to smile about, in honor of your not-be-underestimated feat, it matters not whether you are a nice guy, or a prick, I tip my hat you...



(erratum: the inset photograph, despite the likeness to Sam Zell, is of course, NOT Sam Zell, but Burl Ives. However, his attire was more appropriate for this post than anything Sam Zell would be caught dead wearing, so I've left it, as much for its aptness as for the fact that Burl Ives was the first vinyl record I would play on my parents phonograph when old enough to figure out how to work it)

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Pregnant Thoughts

I've been traveling and too preoccupied with personal affairs to post, but arriving back at home I am pregnant with comments stemming from the sheer quantity of misinformed anger, vitriolic hyperbole, and near-lunacy from all corners of the polity regarding The Financial Crisis, The Credit Crunch, and The Bailout.

First the divide between the guilty and the honest. Indeed some are more directly responsible for neglect, fraud, incompetence. But Americans will remain in denial until they realize it is complex and that nearly ALL AMERICANS (except perhaps my late granny) and some Asians are culpable in one way or an another for how we arrived here. First Americans voted in this administration....TWICE! Not everyone. Maybe not even the majority. But those that apathetically didn't vote against them are guilty. They benefited directly and indirectly from the tax cuts, lack of energy policy, and the war expenditure by gaining employment and income they wouldn't otherwise have had. They benefited from low rates and easy money and lax regulation to buy homes and watched the value of those homes rise dramatically. They removed equity via refi and HELOCs at unprecedented rates, including my late mother who eschewed debt. It was too good a deal to pass up. Few invested it wisely or banked it. Most spent it. On new cars, or kitchen renovations, a Caribbean cruise or stainless-steel appliances. The consumption orgy was obvious to anyone who desired to look, and it touched everyone's lives - directly or indirectly. Few countenanced matching revenues with expendtitures, and most decried the idea by not electing fiscally sober souls to Congress or the Senate. America borrowed from the future to fund the present in all ways, whether via fiscal policy, monetary policy, people's pension funds, corporate balance sheets, or household asset values and expenditures. But now they [the American people] are incensed when the bill has arrived. They have no recollection, nor amazingly can they make the connection between the prior faux-prosperity and the current crisis. Perhaps this results from the fact that while real wages have been falling due to pressures from globalization, this plunge was ameliorated by the past decade. No they don't fly private, or dress their women in Armani garb, or drive leased Aston-Martins, but IMHO is undeniable that they were (until 2008) less-worse-off than they otherwise would have been had the Admin and Fed let things naturally recess in 2001, throttled subsequent credit and policed unbridled extension of credit by the shadow banking system. Someone, however, must explain this to them, so that capital can be extended to the financial system (in whatever the most appropriate, effective and just form) to restore confidence. Even a policy whereby authorities will in effect "insure" their jurisdictional terrain of the interbank market until deleveraging runs it course will in all likelihood be less expensive to the taxpayer than encouraging Mellon-like liquidation. But political and financial ignorance runs deep in this land and it would be ironic if it is precisely this populist ignorance that with hindsight will be viewed as the cause of a new depression, one that might have been ameliorated by wholesale intervention and recapitalisation.

Second. People should stop rueing the controls upon of short-selling. I realise that this is intensely unpopular view in my field, but with the likes of Mssr Hendry extolling the saintliness of his ilk, it needs some tempering. By way of disclosure, I have been an active (and at times aggressive) short-seller for more than seventeen years. There are disingenuous people who will have you believe it is both noble and right to sell short, maybe even god-given. Or that because its risky, or conveying information (however flawed it might be) it earns its rightful place. It has no such moral rectitude. At the best of times, it [short-sellers] may help ferret out fraud, or simply have no effect. But in the current environment, I believe the bans are correct for herd-like front-running of sales by eventual owners are in essence de facto collusion with the same as effect. Yes, it would have been better (as I've been a proponent) to have sustainable policies that would have avoided the asset price rises, over-leveraging, and subsequent revulsion. But we're here, not there, so get over it. Massive short-selling financials (whether deserved or undeserved) eats to the core of systemic confidence. It is of course not alone in compromising systemic integrity. Nor even primary. But these institutions are exceptional. And authorities are right and correct to do what they can do for the impact is the equivalent of whittling away at the systemic foundations and as a result accidentally having the building fall. The flip side is that because banks are exceptional, they should behave that way, not have been allowed to lever-up as they did. They should be repositories of sobriety, and prudent risk-management, NOT places for coin-flipping agents to shoot the moon in order to maximize short-term gain by gaming the Treasury put.

Third, the media has been pathetic and perhaps inflamed both the panic and sense of outrage at authorities acting as (IMHO sensible) liquidity provider of last resort. They have not tried to explain the truths of ultimate culpability to temper the misconstrued outrage. They can slay the easy targets, but educating people on the history of the credit bubble, and of course, their knowing or unknowing participation, would be a great public service. For Americans (and Brits too) never could something-for-nothing, the deal too good to be true, systemically flawed as it might be. Everyone want to eat their cake, and have it too.

Finally, the perils and absurdity of unbridled leveraged financial speculation (as widely practiced) has been demonstrated, with the fallout from hedge funds still to come. The result will be an eventual return to making things and stuff, both tangible and intangible, rather than mere money with money. American zaitech is dead. This will be wholly good thing in the longer run, though the shorter term pain it will inflict upon asset prices as leverage is further reduced will be significant, and will reveal - for those with capital, unleveraged and unencumbered - tremendous opportunity - particularly from the liquidation that will certainly ensue over the coming Q4.

Friday, September 19, 2008

Monkey and The Engineer


You might think your life hard, but I can say without knowing the details it was nothing compared to Country-bluesman Jesse Fuller's. As I've watched events unfold satirizing them along the way with increasing causticity, Mr Fuller's playful tune The Monkey & The Engineer has come recurrently to my mind for it's aptness, culminating in the events this week.

Once upon a time there was an engineer.
Drove a locomotive both far and near.
Accompanied by a monkey that would sit on a stool
Watching everything the engineer would move

One day the engineer wanted a bite to eat,
He left the monkey sitting on the driver's seat,
The monkey pulled the throttle, the locomotive jumped the gun
And did 90 miles an hour down the mainline run.

Big locomotive right on time, big locomotive coming down the line.
Big locomotive No. 99, left the engineer with a worried mind.

The engineer called up the dispatcher on the phone,
To tell him all about his locomotive was gone.
Get on the wire, switch operator to write,
Cause the monkey's got the main line sewed up tight.

The switch operator got the message on time,
Said there's a Northbound limited on the same main line,
Open up the switch I'm gonna let him through the hole,
Cause the monkey's got the locomotive under control.

Big locomotive right on time, big locomotive coming down the line.
Big locomotive No. 99, left the engineer with a worried mind.



(Credit to David Opie for lovely illustrations at http://www.monkeyandtheengineer.com/
Please buy the book for the sake of posterity)

There Is Always Someone Worse Off Than You

My mother was world-class in finding the silver-lining in every cloud. So in the event you may be feeling black-and-blue at having bought the dips on AIG common; gone "all-in" shorting the S&P Bank index earlier this week; having all your Merrill stock options struck > $25; watching your sell-stops on STT triggered at $31; or merely having your money fund loaded-up on Lehman Bros CP, you can take some solace in that fact there is always someone worse off than you, as yours truly can attest. For these trifles are only money. But never, never, NEVER - no matter how turbulent the markets may be - forget your spouse on your fifteenth wedding anniversary...

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Tttttthhllllwwwwopp! (sound of cork popping)

So, at 15:45 EDT, it would appear that you can....place the knives back in the drawer; screw the top back onto the pill bottle; close the upper-floor window; return the "Meditation For Beginners" back to the bookshelf to gather dust; stop filling out the application for that evening course entitled "Retraining 103: HTML For [Former] Traders Who Can't Do Anything Else"; write that check for your children's school fees; and perhaps even open a bottle of the vintage champagne from your cellar that one of your service providers gave when you had sizable business to give, and he had an T&E budget, and toast to the fact the world as we knew it did not completely end...errrr....at least not on this September Thursday. Mine'll be a Veuve Grand Dame 2000 thankyouverymuch.

Monday, September 15, 2008

Ode to Lehman Bros

Debt is like
an onion

you taste it
with delight.

But when lines go
you wonder,

Whatever made
you bite.

Glass Half Full Kind of a Guy

So everyone is talking about the credit crunch and various financial institutions problems in terms of a capital shortage which strikes me the same funky inside-out black-is-white way "savings glut" was applied to describe the phenomena whereby American's were cajoled, no "forced", to import and consume a reasonably larger percentage than they produced and/or exported just because it was there or just because they could. I, on the other hand, see the current problems in terms of an excess of assets, or "asset bloat". For their capital was their capital, and no one forced them (except perhaps the spectre of Shareholder Activists writing letters asking for your removal as CEO) ) to lend to all manner of stupid and risky projects, poor credits, or absurdly securitized turds on dangerously poor terms and at pitiful spreads leading to excessively dangerous levels of capital gearing that in many circumstances (like deep recession) one would plausibly cause said assets to be behave in a correlated manner. Indeed, there was nothing other than the fact that they were highly conflicted and stupidly incented agents and not principals of the [now-diminished or wholly vaporized] equity capital they shepherded that made them do it, from the lowest signatory to the highest man with the over-sized corner office. In the process, they have cavalierly spoiled a reasonably good thing called the financial system - severely damaging it's health, longevity, and confidence therein.

Saving glut? Glass half-full? Capital shortage? Ummmm, I think not....and just so everyone is clear: the fixes (note I didn't say intermediate solutions) are deflationary.

Stop That Check!

In about the ONLY good news of the day, Bloomberg reported that Federal Regulators of Fannie and Freddie are blocking payment of the so-called Golden Parachutes to Mssrs Mudd and Syron. Could it be the case that this is the signal that marks the denoument of Crony Capitalism?!?!

I Whistle a Happy Tune...

I frankly was never one for show-tunes, regrettably sneering [privately] at thespians in my youth. But clearly, how wrong I was!! For sometimes they express more poignantly in music and song that which cannot otherwise be recounted with mere words. Sure Bob Dylan can render archetypes as the bard with verse. But does it compare to the lovely and angelic Anna Leonowens in Rodgers & Hammerstein's "The King & I" ?!??
[ANNA]

Whenever I feel afraid
I hold my head erect
And whistle a happy tune
So no one will suspect
I'm afraid.

While shivering in my shoes
I strike a careless pose
And whistle a happy tune
And no one ever knows
I'm afraid.

The result of this deception
Is very strange to tell
For when I fool the people
I fear I fool myself as well!

I whistle a happy tune
And ev'ry single time
The happiness in the tune
Convinces me that I'm not afraid.

Make believe you're brave
And the trick will take you far.
You may be as brave
As you make believe you are

You may be as brave
As you make believe you are

[LOUIS]

While shivering in my shoes
I strike a careless pose
And whistle a happy tune
And no one ever knows,
I'm afraid.

[LOUIS AND ANNA]

The result of this deception
Is very strange to tell
For when I fool the people
I fear I fool myself as well!

I whistle a happy tune
And ev'ry single time
The happiness in the tune
Convinces me that I'm not afraid.

Make believe you're brave
And the trick will take you far.
You may be as brave
As you make believe you are....

Ich Bin Ein Stockholmers....

After we've all vented and finished our shouts and screams of: "You f*#cking idiots", to mortgage bankers & brokers, bank managers, regulators, MBS originators, bent law-makers, ideologically-challenged regulators, hubristic risk-managers, and bank shareholders (especially the largest institutional ones of the mutual and pension fund variety who owned the big slugs), we can get down to learning Swedish, for it appears that there is no avoiding the fact that we are all Swedish now.

It's early days and there is undoubtedly outrage from taxpayers, who sadly shed their ignorance (and ultimate responsibility, for they elected the administration that encouraged, enabled and avoided prevention) only after the fact. And early days means debate must convene over the pro's and con's of further nationalisation and RTC-like fixes before the buoy of US Federal support is tossed. But its inevitability is so-to-speak a done deal sparing only the most virtuous and least encumbered whoever they may be. In Japan, this took nearly a decade and spared few, so adept were they at avoiding confrontation, and so afraid were they of public wrath. In America and western Europe, we will prove more impatient for solutions and more magnanimous with other people's money and so rescue more quickly. Then there will be the little matter of settling scores with the agents responsible. Sadly they will be hard to pinpoint directly, but I can tell you one thing: IF the public is to be saddled with the bill, they deserve the appointment of a Financial Truth & Reconciliation Commission. And it should be frank as possible. It should document graft, greed, tom-foolery and stupidity; it should locate the guilty and haul them before the People, and it should spare no one including themselves who are just as culpable for believing in "something for nothing" and enabling crony capitalism to [temporarily] triumph under the banner that "no public interest is in your best public interest". Shameful as it will be, America needs a dose of the sobriety it will provide if done properly, before it can move on. The guilty need to admit their sins and plead forgiveness - something that is not assured given the economic carnage and dislocation that will ensue.

Saturday, September 13, 2008

Decades Later, ZZZBest Comes Clean

Most of you will not be old enough to remember Barry Minkow, and his ironically-named former darling growth company ZZZZ Best. Those who do will forever associate its overly-youthful founder (he was 16, as pictured above) with fraud, deception and, if you have a sense of humour, hilarity at the fact that grown-up professional investors drove the carpet-cleaning company's market value past $300mm at one point which is probably more than two billion in today's market-adjusted dollars. But Serge Debrebant in the FT Arts & Weekend tracked-down Mr Minkow and relates a warm and fuzzy story of leopard-spot-changing that is worth a gander .

For those not wanting to read the actually story, Mr Minkow, having served a reasonable stint in the big bouse, discusses his experience with the dark side, the incremental criminal evolution of many fraudstersactivities and his redemption. Having repented and seen the error of ways, Minkow is now, ironically, a committed fraud-buster, (for as he says, who better to catch a contrapreneur than a fraudster?!?!) and he goes on to describe some of his recent exploits at doing good to make up for doing bad in his personal "My Name is Earl" pursuit.

Friday, September 12, 2008

Newsbot Hair-Trigger

Whether you knew it or not (or believed it), some shops have strategies that are based upon bots that scour the web for market-moving events and significant news changes, and trades accordingly. Not passing judgments here, it is sufficient to say such pursuits are still in their early days, with some of the ummm errrr kinks yet to be worked out.

At least that is what can be inferred from the erroneous plunge in the shares of United Airlines (UAL) as recounted on Hardware News on Wednesday (hat-tip to NT for the link).

Yes, an obscure almost irrelevant mis-classification of known and stale info triggered sales that crashed the shares. While the bot-based strategy was deemed to be the initiating source, it was NOT the entire reason for the rout. Indeed, a cascade followed, presumably fed by stops, position initiation by trend-following and order sniffers, that caused sufficient moves to panic and trigger real investors to short-sell or puke existing positions, and/or limit automatic liquidity-providers uptake - at least until "the news is out". The situation wasn't helped by the company's teetering-on-edge financial position and near-serial use of chapter-11 protection.

Boys with toys indeed!!

Thursday, September 11, 2008

Talking Holiday Homesick Blues


Picking up an International Property magazine such as those one finds in the BA lounge is good place for one to begin to imagine the full extent of changes to be wrought by recession, deleveraging, and higher energy prices (even taking into account recent falls and probabilities that they diminish more). Development after development of golf course, seaside, quay-side, urban-destination-side shitbox holiday homes and bungalows percolates through the pages searching for unwitting saps still unaware of what the future holds. Portugal, Greece, Spain Cyprus, Dubai, Turkey, FLorida Gulf coast and all manner of remote pacific isles (heretofore unheard of except by those prone to thumbing the Times Atlas of the world for amusement) beckons buyers with bikini-clad women, freshly-painted exteriors, lushly-manicured gardens in areas devoid of water, and bull-market tag-lines that implore readers to seize the good life they aspire-to and more importantly deserve, while touting the investment merits of past and future-promised returns. These are not the palaces and estates with split-panel multi-lingual Russian-English descriptions - themselves sure-to-be effected by the 50% drop in the RTS and assault on Mechel - but the ones being peddled to those that already have-been, are, or will soon be further squeezed in the vise of deep economic recession, asset-price deflation and restricted credit. Woe be he or she that is tempted by such disingenuous dross.

One need only cursorily observe the near-complete reversal of the virtuous feedback loop of seemingly unlimited cheap credit, low real-terms liquid hydrocarbon prices, declining savings rates, low and declining unemployment rates and proliferation of cheap air transport to understand just how vulnerable and absurd these development pecadilloes appear at present begging the question of who will ultimately take title of these, and at what primary and secondary market prices these will clear. Merely look at Spain's bust to see what lies in store - and this is all before the pain in the real economy has begun to be felt in its inverted glory.

Now, with we in the developed world face dramatically curtailed consumption, higher unemployment, lower core asset price and associated wealth destruction, probably higher taxes or higher imported goods prices from Asia (depending upon which course policymakers choose) creating a spiral that in the process will slaughter (amongst other things) such feeble and fatuous projects such as those pitched next to Panerai watches and Brioni suits.

In 2006, there were so many glossy property magazines being stuffed into the mailslots of SW London flats, one could only imagine the deforestation and coated-paper chemical cocktails required to support it. Such tell-tales are useful indicators in discerning "tops" and manias. Now in latter half of 2008, such panderings of real estate porn are down to a trickle, as estate agents stare forlornly at window shoppers from their desks. And as surely as Sterling is overvalued, developed nation wages will NOT be rising any time soon, and all this will be destructive destructive to corporate earnings (and thus share prices), the international second-home property spec bonanza for people who cannot really afford it is certain to follow the same fate, with few, least of all yours truly, shedding any tears over their transformation from perceived bricks & mortar to Castles Made of Sand.

Money Illusion Quote of the Day

An article in Business Week detailed the westward expansion of the LeFrak family, who recently bought a reasonable slug of Hollywood office space. BW highlighted that despite the high prices (~USD800sq ft) they paid, and deteriorating market, these were "so-called long-term investments" The youngest, Jamie, Gen3 of LeFrak dynasty was optimistically (or pessimistically depending upon your view of sound money) quoted as saying:
I want my great-grandson to say, 'Wow, you only paid $800 a square foot for that? It's worth $80,000 today..."

Sunday, September 07, 2008

Farewell Fannie and Freddie

So farewell
then
Fannie Mae
and
Freddie
Mac.

You were
like the relatives
who wouldn't
leave....being
magnanimous by
sharing with your friends
the best bottles
from my
cellar.

And drinking
my beer...
but not
replacing
it.

At least
you could have had
the courtesy
to put some of
my warm ones
back in the
fridge.

Then...
You went
Berserk...
(with an
upper-case
"B")

Stealin' money
from my purse
and using my
charge cards
to pimp and party
with every lowlife
in town.

Some people
were happy
you were shacked-up
at mine, but
it wasn't
me.

But the thing
that I really
wanted to ask you was:
WTF-ingF were you
thinking?!?!

Thursday, September 04, 2008

Couple of Questions RE: Ospraie...

Some years ago, when Russia defaulted, a quite successful and well-regraded global fund named Everest Capital run by Marko Dmitrievic (sic?) had a harrowing near-death experience resulting from sizable GKO positions. Their assets droppped substantially with losses and some redemptions, but they made their case to their investors about what they did, and (perhaps surprisingly in the Darwinian world of Hedge Funds) many stuck it out. Yes fifty percent (read 50%) below your high-water mark means working like a mutual fund plebe for a few years with NO performance fees. Yet they persevered, and the investors who stayed with them were satisfied as they got paid on their short S&P hedges at the turn of the century and tagged the BRIC phenom rising like a phoenix out of the tech-bust.

So one must ask "why NOT Ospraie?? Why is Dwight Anderson bailing out? Where is the longer-term story or table-pounding about the long-cycle? Surely most investors need/want something like a commodity specialists in their FoFs or engineered portfolios...why not Ospraie? Is it shame or is the world so Darwinian that everyone just wants their cash back to give it to the luckier, or more astute traders who for whatever reason got it more right, or less-wrong than Mr Anderson...this time. He's presumably got Lehman's cash (even if its 50 cents on the dollar in value) and accumulated fees from the last four years which even after a fifty percent haircut is wealth beyond most successful traders' wildest imagination which like Everest before him, provides a stable asset base to punt around in those things that he presumably knows best.

Or maybe he has been hit with self-doubt about his prowess, or perhaps doubt about the longevity of a commodity boom in an overlevered liquid-hydrocarbon-challenged world where demographics in the rich countries (and China) will soon turn demonstrably for the worse, and authorities may finally acknowledge that it's excess demand that is the real problem. For what could be worse for commodity prices than parsimonious scaling down and conservation, for whatever reasons be they ecological economical, or philosophical. I do not pretend to know the answer.

But I look back on Everest's commitment, to do their best for themselves and their co-investors and I see an admirable integrity. No closing because they are too far below the high-water mark. No shuttering due to shame or embarrassment. OK maybe it was tax or some unknown considerations. But not being uber-cynical, I still cannot help but wonder about Ospraie, for Mr Anderson is an admitted substantial co-investor in his Fund. And I wonder how this will look to those sitting on the fence in the debate over whether the HF model is stupid and wildly asymmetric - paying gobs on the upside, and bolting with the cash at the first chance when adversity strikes. Maybe EVERYONE wants out, and I am wrong to raise the question of integrity, asymmetric payouts and disincentives to continuity. Or maybe everyone is simply tired of paying "alpha fees" for beta. We'll probably know the truth soon, in any event.

Wednesday, September 03, 2008

Bad HF Poetry

So farewell
then
Ospraie -
Dubious
commodity
trader and
even worse
speller.

"Never send a man
to do
a machine's job"
said Mr Anderson's
nemesis.

Oooops.
Though apt, that
was the wrong
Mr Anderson
(from The Matrix -ed.)

At least
the right Mr Anderson
will be able
to say:
"At least I tried to
shoot the moon".

Your epitaph
will be:
"never leverage a portfolio of
highly correlated, over-pimped,
over-crowded traded after
they've moved unimaginably large amounts -
no matter how compelling the story"

(with usual apologies to EJ Thribb and PrivateEye, and thanks MM)

Saturday, August 30, 2008

Quote of the Day

Best quote of the day (meaning no disrespect to housewives) from BBC interview with Congresswoman Ford on the anouncement of Sarah Palin as McCain's running mate:
BBC Interviewer: "Don't you think she's errrr rather inexperienced???"

Congresswoman Ford: "Well, no, I mean, she's a working mother with wonderful experience running a household..."


The VP debate with Biden will not be a pretty sight...

Friday, August 29, 2008

Tiiiiiiimmmmmberrrrrrrrrrrr !!!!!!!!

Happy Friday Chelsky property owners! Just in case you missed it, and were contemplating using your maison de ville as collateral for a 25-Flightpack from Netjets, Bloomberg reported prestige UK estate agents Knight Frank admission/calculation that high-end Central London props registered their first year-on-year price falls since 2003 in the YTD ending July, following the fourth straight month of consecutive MoM declines. Credit Crunch, City Bonuses blah blah blah you know the drill. Yet, London continues to be the magnet for the uber-rich with mega-props (i.e. those > GBP10million)continuing to register gains. FOr those tempted, I will again remind them that I reckon most buyers non-Sterling buyers will eventually be able to purchase their dream pied-a-terre in London's capital at 35% discount from peak values and a further 30% discount from a diminishing sterling rate of exchange. Vertigo, indeed!

They Lost More Money Than They Ever Made....

Each cyclical purge witnesses the fall from grace of investors who, while superhumanly belief-defyingly profitable in the past have their Icarus moment with hubris, greed, fat-tails, or mere complacence. To a reasonably conservative [risk-taker, not political orientation] contrarian, the flame-outs typically involved large egos quite literally losing more money than they EVER made, for their successes were on smaller amounts of capital where their risk-taking denoument gone awry was typically upon a mind-numbingly large wodge of capital. I still smile at this phrase: They lost more money than they ever made (think Merriweather, Carhart, Jon Wood, Brian Hunter, Cioffi to mention but a few).

Such escapades in the corporate realm of the diversified financial enterprise were rarer, though as The FT pointed out this morning (with thanks to Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism) Merrill Lynch is coming decidedly close to reaching the same point as having "lost" more than they've ever made in cumulative profits since listing. While few are celebrating at the near breaching of this ignoble threshold, some (perhaps Mr Thain, and a handful of Merrill's recent hires) who've struck options and incentive plans to the firms' fortunes with stock at de minimus levels may find a pot of gold in such ignominimy, as anyone who elected to forego cash bonuses and was awarded HERBIES in 1990 and 1991 (named fondly after Herb Allison, the Stuffer of The Stuffees). I am surprised John Mack hasn't tried that one....

Inside The BLS: Q2 GDP was 3.3% ...?!?!?

An optimist can surely conjure many explanations [surely "lame excuses"?? -ed.] for how the United States BLS arrived at their upwardly revised 3.3% growth measurement for US GDP.  Realists, such a Merrill Lynch Senior Economist David Rosenberg, have deconstructed the number and suggested one take it with a grain of proverbial salt. He sees the alledged upside surprise resulting from a concentrated revision in net exports, and despite a Q2 CPI running in excess of an annualized 5% and PPI close 10%, skeptically at the suggestion that non-financial corporate deflator deflated at an annual rate of 3.8%. Ummmm. Yeah. I must admit that without even reviewing the details, the numbers appear so far departed from any experienced reality as to raise my eyebrows and search for the real explanation, whereupon I discovered rumours of what actually might happened...
- Deputy statistician's dog ate the BLS work-sheet
- Computer Error....(damned Dell boxes)
- BLS borrowed their deflator model from Moody's
- Karl Rove hacked into a BLS spreadsheet and "flipped the sign" on the deflator
- BLS spent so much time trying to massage the numbers they didn't have time to accurately calculate the numbers
- Made a paper plane out of the real number, but it got hijacked
- Left the real number at home, but it got repossessed
- Statistician was too busy thinking about whether or not he/she should quit this monkey house
- "Deflator"? Deflator?!? BLS statistician thought he was told to be a confabulator".
- BLS used the new invisible paper, and now they can't find it
- BLS has been using solar-powered calculators and it's been cloudy.
- Got mistaken for an Xmas wish list and sent to Santa Claus
- BLS has been using solar-powered calculators and it's been cloudy.
- Lent it to the Chinese so they can study our rigourous statistical methods to help them alter their own reality 

What is one to make of all this? Well first and foremost don't get suckered into buying stocks or covering shorts on the back of a bogus number. There may be reasons to own certain stocks, but kneejerk reaction to an outlier isn't one of them.

Thursday, August 28, 2008

Found: A Solution to Our Problems!!

Now I realize that some of the smartest minds in the world have set their brains to work on the credit crunch. Some, like John Paulson, Falcone, Einhorn and Ackman have ventured towards the more parochially selfish, some might even argue nefarious, in applying their energies to profiting from problems that have beset what may in the end affect billions of people?

But need it have happened at all? Might we imagine an alternate, decidedly rosier future, one where American Triumphalism is eternal? What if we had all just continued down the unquestioning path of believing and assuming that the prevailing price was right? That current account & budget deficits need not be heeded? That real estates always appreciate? That war can be financed by future generations? That the supply of liquid hydrocarbons is inexhaustible. That HumVees are cool? That global warming is someone else's problem? That no public interest is the best public interest? Where am I going with this?

I was simply wondering whether all this is financial furor is simply, well, psychological, behavioural, maybe even imagined? And if so, perhaps, rather than embarking upon some of the messy heavy lifting and austerity seemingly required to alter consumption, savings and political orientation problems, we can simply alter our minds. Enter Neuro-Linguistic Programming. Why has this been relegated to the likes of McDonalds and the soap-powder advertisers, when the world of high-finance is simply screaming out for quick and easy solutions to the big financial and economic problems of our day such as sustaining the price s of level-3 assets, monoline solvency, performance of Alt-A or BBB mortgage tranches as well as extending the maximum amount of leverage households and the US government might safely assume before the lenders say no?

Indeed when one watches the fabulous Derren Brown operate upon a dyed-in-the wool cynic like english actor-director-writer Simon Pegg, (embedded below - and a must watch for everyone)


one might wonder why any of us feel there is anything wrong at all...

Thursday, August 21, 2008

Peak Oil!! Peak Inflation ?!? Peak Credit??

Does Peak Credit inevitably follow piqued credit? Well if you're my age, and you thought so and positioned accordingly, you'd have been bankrupted a very long time ago - possibly as early as the late 1980s. And if you were a glutton for punishment, you'd have been toasted again in 1994, another time in 1998, yet again in 2002, and rubbing one's nose in it, perhaps every year after that until midsummer two-thousand-and-seven. Dog days indeed for those bearish on the ability of the financial system to manufacture, distribute, and service debt, whether in real or nominal terms, or in relation to any measure of the economy or change in the growth thereof.

Yet as pessimistic on its sustainability (and wrong!!) as one would have been in the past, one should now be as optimistic one's assessment that this is The Big One, that we've smacked head-first into the boundary of the maximum amount of debt that can be assumed by households, corporates and governments in our economy and be reasonably sustained with the fruits of our labour, and investment. Actually, I would posit that we long-ago pierced any reasonably sustainable threshold, and only through sheer inertia and the fortuitiousness of pulling of rabbits-out-of-hats have we lasted this long. But it is the anchoring of popular belief in faith and absent solvency from days long passed combined with the extrapolation a series of non-extrapolatable macro income streams which could cause any sensible human being believe or have believed that the boundary lay somewhere in front of us and not far behind us.

Culpability is not singular. Stern-Stewart, investor short-termism and systemic mono-focus, along with greedy managers replete with agent/principal dilemmas must assume blame on the corporate side. Selfish American Voters repeatedly demanding representatives requite incongruous financial goals with cynically lame and unsustainable fiscal policies, along with a near complete detachment from reality in regards to present consumptive desires in relation to both incomes and longer-term savings requirements are just as at fault as the monetary wrecktitude resulting from an unwillingness to accept mild deflation and cyclical recessions where required for reasons that - to this day remain inexplicable given that Continental Europeans seemingly had little difficulty distinguishing a bubble or accepting that both taxes and economic brush-fires are not inherently bad in The Big Picture.

So IF what we are currently witnessing, commonly termed as The Credit Crunch, is in fact, an expression of what I will term Hubbert's financial equivalent - "Peak Credit" phenomena , and IF as I posit, we long ago untethered the financial wagon from the real economic train, what does this mean?

Many things, but first and foremost, that we are at a major and painful inflection that will impose a real Kunstleresque austerity upon Americans converging their desires with their means. In a word, this means "revulsion", a somewhat arcane and long-forgotten term for large-scale write-downs and/or economy-wide elimination of outstanding debt(s). For this reflects the implausibility of servicing, let alone paying off obligations, and the consequences to those whose capital and assets were/are/will be vaporized. It will, undoubtedly, be fought by authorities, with certain costs borne by the state and socialized upon unwitting voters. Japan wallowed in their own debt-shite for more than decade, and in the US it is (in present political climate of denial) even more natural that attempts to band-aid and stave off the inevitable reality will likewise be tried. In another time and another place, natural growth and demographics might have met inflation somewhere in the middle and the cycle would resume again without massive dislocation. But this time it is different. This time, the encumbrances are too large. This time, there is competition for markets, and their value propositions are surpassing Americas. This time the patient is too soft, obese, relatively uneducated, faux-faithful, weak, politically compromised, and cronily corrupt. This time, the business cycle is turning dramatically for the worse, wealth effects are only beginning to bite, oil has peaked with a generation of adjustment between any remotely plausibly cost-effective replacement. And competition is even heating up in the emerging world for the remaining high-margin business. This does not sound like an environment that will assist households or government to rebuild balance sheets and make good on obligations without great sacrifice from ordinary people and even greater sacrifices from the monied class. This sounds like an environment where creditors and debtors will be required to sit down and negotiate what can and might plausibly be paid, or converted into equity, or stretch maturity with lower rates - anything to keep it as an "asset" and a performing one.

"Peak Credit", like Peak Oil, thus forlornly reflects the necessity of increasing demand for credit from borrowers to sustain the unsustainable, at precisely the time when supply is constrained and shrinking, for suppliers are squarely confronting the reality that new sources are limited, and in any event, the demanders (even if supplied) have diminishing hope in the current environment of returning what was lent.

Some will think that these ruminations border on the insane. And I will admit that when I walk out of my office door to the local trendy coffee bar, there is scant evidence where I live that Peak Credit is anything but a financial phenomena - limited to the flippers in Vegas or the spec developers in Fla. or CA. But perhaps that's because the most insidious aspect of Peak Credit is its disruption to the chain of dependencies that bore its hallmark over the past two-and-one-half decades. So inexorable and complete has the rise of credit been in its permeation of every crevice of life that no one blinks when multi-trillion dollar GSE balance sheets are supported by but the thinnest veneer of equity - even AFTER large potentially (no, probably) impermanent increases in underlying asset values; when dogs receive pre-approved credit cards by mail; that its sheer ubiquity produces persistently negative rates of saving; when corporates use leverage in lieu of a margin of balance-sheet safety on the enterprises they are meant to steward in order to conform and placate the markets' twisted short-sighted ideal of optimal capital structure leaving them woefully exposed to cyclical fluctuations; where data-mined models themselves based on limited data replace good common sense; where leaders defer to unsustainable plebeian notions of what constitutes prudent fiscal policy producing errors in judgment that make the trench warfare of the first world war appear sane. If this is what God's country resembles, imagine the financial horror in hell...

"Peak Credit" will wreak as monumental changes upon American consumptive life as Peak Oil, and these cannot help but exert a massive deflationary pull - at least until such time as the parties agree to squarely face reality that confronts them, and in an interconnected world, everyone else.

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Will The Hedge Fund Model Prove to Be Broken

Separating the shills from the bona fide proponents of hedge funds has never been easy. Nor has it been facile to distinguish the secretly-jealous critic from the legitimately, even altruistically concerned. In an interview with Bloomberg's Tom Keene, the articulate David Goldman, former Chief Strategist at Asteri Capital, posits in no unequivocal terms, that the "Hedge Fund Model" of investment will, over the coming-year, prove to be broken beyond repair.

What precisely does he mean? In a nutshell, he means that the majority of Hedge Fund performance will not be able to weather the volatility caused by the continuing de-leveraging and the catastrophic blow-up of so-called crowded trades that this will cause - something that is, and will continue to be exacerbated by the lack actual liquidity in many of the instruments and positions currently favored or stuck like chewing gum to bottoms of their respective portfolios.

The hedge fund model of stewarding money for one or two-and-twenty is, he suggests, predicated upon reasonably low volatility and above average returns. Yet like young unskilled schoolboys playing football (tank you Charles of IBEX Salads for the image), there are obvious trades and simply far-too-many participants chasing the same returns causing the trades to be intensely crowded. These over-exploited trades (in the short-term) are prone to massive bouts of short-covering necessitated by the very hedge fund model itself, for few funds, managers have the confidence (or the investors) that will forgive 20% to 30% monthly drawdowns for riding shorter-term aberrations in exchange for the eventually larger kill in having the right ultimately correct position. Strangely enough, no one's behaviour is illogical. It is just another example of a local optimization problem.

If this sounds to readers like the accident that initially availed itself in the Quant implosion of Aug 2007, then you are correct. And if this sounds like what is happening to unfortunate longs in the energy and commodity complexes, you are also right. Goldman believes that this will manifest itself in an near-unending decimation of funds pursuing the simplest model. He makes exception for the prescient funds, with the actual lock on capital (permanent exchange -traded vehicles or 3 to 5 year locks a-la- the Private Equity model) who also have the conviction, and strength of constitution to make high conviction bets and hold them despite the itinerant volatility of the positions and consequential vicissitudes of mark-to-market. Verbatim, he says:
"...with everyone forced to take the same trade, the volatility, intra-month, is so great, those investors committed to a month-to-month Sharpe-ratio low volatility strategy will be forced to redeem and you will get wild swings, illiquidity, and an inability to liquidate positions.

So I think we are going to have a serial catastrophe of hedge funds, particularly the kind of funds that thought that it was a great idea to buy loans at $0.90 on the dollar and won't be able to sell them at $0.80 later in the year.

Note that he is not bearish on opportunism, nor speculation. He thinks people like TPG did great trades buying assets "cheap" with something resembling matched, non-recourse funding. He simply thinks that doing the same thing (and there is no shortage of managers pursuing such spread returns in part or in whole) without the surety of similar investor commitment horizons on the equity capital side OR committed facilities on the finance side is a recipe for disaster, or at least an unwind cascade of ghoulish proprtions.

To some extent the Fed (like the BoJ before it) can put the brakes on the systemic point-in-time unwind cascades. It can cajole institutions to hold off, it can nationalize banks and make for a more organized liquidation of duff collateral and assets, i.e. whatever it takes to prevent the institutions at the system's core from selling position to make position - something that has little actual utility in fact. But the authorities have little control over hedge funds' investors, and hence the their resulting demands for liquidity.

I personally find such a continued evolution quite plausible. And it won't be undeserved. For other market participants have had ample time to prepare after witnessing the quant-related meltdown. I do wonder whether investors will, as a result, force the Darwinian HF survivors, to accept long-term incentives with clawbacks that manage to incorporate liquidity discounts and incentive payments based upon realizations - a sorely needed interest alignment tool. Maybe I've been a tad unfair to the PE guys by comparison...

Sunday, August 17, 2008

Why UK House Prices Are Going Much Lower

Sometimes anecdotes are the most powerful evidence in turning the obvious, or the mere statistically-likely into the deterministic. Such was the case with a post entitled pfwooooor!!, my faithful recounting of an encounter with a dyed-in-the-wool wide-boy southwest London property speculator. Friends are no longer incredulous about my increasingly requited forecasts for both UK Property and Cable. Those friends who live abroad, and will eventually acquire something back in the UK are now waiting for an evolution in prices closer to the -30% (in asking prices) and -30% (in sterling) that I think will coincidentally benefit a would-be purchaser from a dollar-earners perspective.

Last night I was broadsided by another such anecdote. Some friends are selling their ordinary 1br Westminster mansion block flat purchased less than a decade ago for approx one-third of the current asking price (GBP 475000) which sounds decidedly more benign than the 350% price-appreciation this represents. "So what's the current yield?" I asked casually, (and slightly impolitely, feeling almost as if I was asking one's salary). "Pardon me?" was the reply. I tried again: "You know, the rental yield, the annual rent less costs, taxes and fees divided by the capital value...." A quizzical and slightly confused look crossed their face indicating that they'd NOT REALLY THOUGHT ABOUT IT, at length, or recently, anyways. "I - I - don't really know.....it's not leveraged". Now I knew a-priori this was NOT a lifestyle asset. It had been rented since purchase and was a financial spec property (and as good as it gets in hindsight from any perspective - particularly a USD one. But that was then, and this is now. Helping them out, I suggested "...so income was never a factor since it was so small compared to capital appreciation, right?" "Yes!! Yes!! That's it". Hmmm. I see. They did their sums, acknowledging that it wasn't much and virtually apologized for the paltry income. I translated it into a meaningful number (without looking shocked): "That's about two-and-one-half percent". They added that the "market was slow" and that their agent actually thought they'd need to drop their asking price GBP 25,000 or approx 5%.

Unequivocally, I offered them my advice: "Preserve your gains - Hit any bids". "Don't dally". "Forward sell your sterling". "Value convergence is in motion and will NOT be reversed. Neither incomes nor inflation are likely to rise any where near what is required to prevent price destruction. Finance will remain scarce. The heady days of housing asset price appreciation untethered from yield and sanity will be absent for some time to come...." Look out below!

Thursday, August 14, 2008

BoJ Minutes

Nearly anyone who should be interested in Japanese monetary policy stopped reading the BoJ's minutes a long long time ago. For life is fleeting as best stated by Confucious' wisdom pearl: "Even the Emperor cannot take back one single day". That said, out of some erstwhile macabre fascination, I opened the minutes from their latest meeting, and would urge those who cannot find anything better to do while collecting UVs on their beach-of-choice, to have a gander - both for entertainment and personal edification.

The BoJ has been independent only since 1999, but after reviewing the minutes one would be forgiven for questioning whether this was in fact the case. The meeting begins with reasonably spartan Staff Summaries reviewing open market operations and recent developments in financial markets both domestically and internationally, highlighting developments in US, Euro zone, China and other EMs. They were sanguine about the domestic economy highlighting some price pressures (that put real rates into negative territory), but as always were quick to qualify this with expectations for moderation of the trend (else the staffer will be sent for a stint at the BoJ travel office, and be forced to make their own tea). Staffers were not referred to by name in the minutes.

Discussions of the Policy Board Members were then recounted. Members agreed (unanimously, of course) that 1) things would slow domestically, 2) despite positive growth, risks remained for the int'l economy; 3) credit markets remained strained; 4) US would remain weak due to negative feedback loop (perhaps the only perceptive comment in the entire minutes; 5) Euro area should continue to grow albeit at a slower pace; (huh??) 6) Global price pressures were demand led, from EMs (Hello Chindia!). "One member" (and we do not ever know who it is since they are always referred to anonymously lest they say something contentious that might threaten their ability to marry of a son or daughter to a 'good family') suggested that this would not abate until EM governments took appropriate policy measures (bravo! - but then it's always easier to criticize someone else...).

Fascinatingly, in making the suggestion that Euro area might slow, not a single member even mentioned that Euro-Yen rate, or that exchange rates might have something with anything anything nor was there any mention of trade surpluses, conveniently scrubbed to "export volumes" or "changes thereof". Inflation was a considerable topic of concern, discussing various causes, and likely outcomes, though despite such interest, concern was not so elevated as cause a single member to dissent, or seemingly suggest that real rates should be anything but negative. Carry trades and diminishing home bias of investors - either by global banks or the million+ FX day traders respectively were NOT mentioned anywhere.

Moving on to anonymously discuss the domestic economy, it was all benign and antisceptic talk that has no bearing on anything since no action would be taken, then back onto mild inflationary concern, and parroting Staffers view that moderation is near, along with other do-nothing justifications about Japanese exceptionalism with regards to growth-risks, and the adoption of a forward-looking, wait-and-see approach such that the unanimous result, once again, was to DO NOTHING, SAY NOTHING, CRITICIZE NOTHING

Then, in the final section, Don Corleone (The Ministry of Finance representative), whose been "observing" the meeting swaggers in to deliver his comments (and it IS a He), whereupon he listed four more polite suggestions as to why, Board Members, (presuumably under threat of being tarred, feathered and scarlet lettered), should refrain from taking any action, (else some unfortunate accident happen). These not-so-subtle suggestions were followed by Two-Yen from the Cabinet Office Representative also observing the meeting who (true to form) timidly suggested another four reasons for DOING NOTHING.

So in the end, unsurprisingly, the Board Members once again voted unanimously to DO NOTHING. While I am undoubtedly harsh, for this time, their hesitatancy might - for once - be justified, it should not go unoticed that an entire seven year business cycle of ZIRP and nearZIRP has passed with nary a peep from the BoJ. All which reminded me of the Galapagos Albatross, a large white bird with an unimaginably large wingspan, who returns to those islands for a month or so to breed, before resuming what is a year-long flight voyage at sea. These birds are so awkward and gangly that they actually need a running start to launch themselves off of a cliff to use the rising thermals in order to get airborne. But these Albatross, you see, are indecisive and apparently not very courageous. One can sit for hours and watch them milling about pensively and hesitantly before running to take-off, only and inevitably to chicken-out and abort when they approach the edge, after which they sullenly walk back to the beginning of their well-worn runway. They may do this a dozen times or more making the move, a record only outdone by that Albatross of central banks, the BoJ.

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

See ya !! - Wouldn't Want to Be Ya'

A black-box systematic long-short equity trader whose strategy has a momentum bias is sitting on a park bench reading his morning newspaper. His friend sees him and comes over to give his greetings, and, surprised to see that his friend is reading Investors Business Daily (for he, too, is a Systematic Black Box Trader with a momentum biased strategy) says: "Warren, I can't believe your reading that distorted-pack-lies CANSLIM rubbish!. What the hell's gotten into you?!?!"

Warren replied: "Nothing. I've just had it up to 'here' with the real world of momentum being so ugly...At least in the IBD world of momentum, traders are profitable, their stops usually work, one rarely gets whipsawed, and everyone wants to be one..."

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

Olympic Results: (in Full)

(Beijing - Aug 11)

Overnight Interest Rate Pentathalon

Gold ...... ....Turkey
Silver .........Iceland
Bronze....... Brazil

Final Standings (for qualifiers only)

Turkey.............16.25%
Iceland.............15.50%
Brazil...............13.00%
South Africa......12.00%
Egypt...............10.50%
India.................9.00%
Hungary.............8.50%
New Zealand.......8.00%
China...............7.50%
Australia...........7.25%
Norway.............5.75%
Korea (South).....5.25%
United King........5.00%
Sweden.............4.50%
Germany/France/
Belgium/Spain
etc.................4.25% (all tied)
Slovakia...........4.25%
Taiwan............3.62%
Czech Rep........3.50%
Hong Kong.......3.50%
Canada............3.00%
Switzerland......2.75%
United States....2.00% (Disqual - doping!!)
Japan..............0.50% (Disqual- false starts)

Current World Recordholder: Zimbabwe-(800.00%, 2008)

Monday, August 11, 2008

Dear Investor....

ACME Systematic Leveraged Macro Momentum Fund LP
321 Overprice Street
Greenwich, CT
00573


Dear Investor,

This letter is to inform you that the wheels have come off of the proverbial wagon at ACME Systematic Leveraged Macro Momentum Fund LP, and that the same awesome thematic portfolio that made you feel (in the first half-year) as if you'd become very rich in comparison to those sucking wind on their leveraged MBS portfolios or Japanese Small-Cap Value Funds, has, quite literally, spontaneously combusted in our faces.

Our long-oil (PBR, SU, SWN), long coal (MEE, BTU), long fertilizer (POT, MOS), and long iron ore (CLF, RIO) positions have been crushed (no pun intended), and though we remain hopeful going forward as the story remains "in tact", our models have forced us to sell some in response to prevailing price action. Our offsetting shorts in selected financials (MS, BLK, GS, and LM) have not fared as we expected, while our core retail and consumer discretionary shorts in AZO & URBN, DECK have quite literally been lodged deeply and inexplicably in an unmentionable orifice.

If that were all we'd not be too sullen, all things considered, but unfortunately our short US dollar positions (vs. everything), our JPYNZD & CHFAUD carry trades have also not performed to forecasted expectations, and both our our long-only, and zero-exposure long vs. short commodity baskets have imploded with a rapidity that would even frighten Taleb to vows of silence. Oh, and if that weren't enough, our gold and silver longs, too, have gone south as if trying to re-embed themselves in the ground, whilst the short Russell-2000 ETFs we've been using as a hedge have been behaving all-too priapically. These losses of course are not as bad - relatively speaking - as some of our peers (who regretfully are no longer in business) and should of course be viewed in the proper context of our delft avoidance of long exposure in the worst of the RMBS and CMBS sectors, our eschewing of becoming a CDO issuer/manager, and our resolve to avoid anything denominated in Icelandic Kronor. Unfortunately we still have a large (leveraged) position in high-yielding cov-lite loans, US sub-prime credit-card-backed receivables for which we remain unable to obtain sensible bids at levels near to where our auditors and administrators agreed that we should pay our prior year's incentive fees. Only our long Japanese REIT portfolio and our unlisted fund of Spanish Olive Groves have held their ground, though regretfully we refrained from hedging the currency risk, and so these too, are now in the red and eroding rapidly.

We have no explanation, since our trades are systematically based upon doing what others are doing (only, hopefully, faster... though, in this instance, not fast enough). Nor do we offer you apologies. You [presumably] knew the risks, and felt the glory (if only for a while). We do lament the the now-sky-high high-water mark, and the absence of performance fees (this year).

Finally, saving the best for last, we will be suspending redemptions as per the Force Majeureclause 6(c)-2 of the Private Placement Information Memorandum of the Fund. We trust you'll agree that only something supernatural could have torpedoed such a finely constructed portfolio put together by the best and the brightest Wall St. has to offer.

Yours sincerely,

Hugh G. Fallis - Managing Partner
ACME Systematic Leveraged Macro Momentum Fund LP

Friday, August 08, 2008

FSA Report on False HBOS Rumours (in full)

Slow on the draw, I missed the Aug 1 release of FSA's Investigation into accusations that HBOS was torpedoed by hedge funds spreading malicious rumours. If you missed it too, FT-Alphaville has the detail here, but I'll save you the trouble and summarize it for you below.
10. Something went seriously wrong in the market that mid-March day in regards to HBOS share price moves.

9. Our research staff reconstructed the day's activity by looking at exchange time&sales, derivatives trades, emails, phone records, chat rooms, some internet porn (during our break) spoke with reporters, and consulted a psychic.

8. What we strikingly found out was that the stock price went down...a lot.

7. It was clearly the result of more sellers than buyers which made the HBOS price fall more than it would have if this hadn't been the case.

6. This was exacerbated by the fact the few people wanted to buy, and lots wanted to sell (or do nothing), following the manslaughter of Bear Stearns the week prior. In our view (as a non-regulator) this in entirely understandable.

5. Some of the selling was apparently caused by rumours of an unknown origin that were clearly malicious. If we ever catch them, we will hang them upside-down in the naughty-tree.

4. While in this instance, we didn't find any obviously guilty people as everyone had plausible excuses for their activity, nor did we find the so-called smoking gun, we did find a few computers that were culpable (the were Dell's apparently) as their algorithmic strategies sold when they saw others selling.

3. We DID confirm that when market participants are stressed and their nerves are frayed, rumours can have outsized impacts upon share prices.

2. Irrespective the outcome of this investigation, we will be watching you in the future. Watching is the operative word here, as it remains difficult to actually prove anything in such cases.

1. Most importantly, in order to deal with such situations in the future, we will be studying how to write better reports, and are resolved to improving our communication. This will give comfort to our constituency that they can safely remain here in London, and needn't move to Geneva.

Wednesday, August 06, 2008

The Value of Capital vs. The Value of Management

There is an interesting tug-o-war between the value of capital and the value of management evident in hedge funds, but even more strikingly highlighted perhaps in reinsurance. This is worthy of examination if only for the fact that they sit at opposite ends of the proverbial rope, producing (at present) an unimaginably large gulf between the two.

Anchoring one side, we have have the traditional reinsurance company. Once jokingly the last refuge for those ex-college football players that failed in the sleepy primary insurance market, these companies have come a long way from their disparaging caricature and Lloyds scandals - a time coinciding with capacity shortages from Hurricane Andrew that spawned a new class of dedicated entity with less-conflicted, more professional managements. They now sport reasonably disciplined underwriting and specialty lines that give them some diversification, with some even moving up the food chain to compete in the primary market. In this realm, the market for new-venture creation is reasonably efficient with an able management team able to raise capital from a variety of experienced private equity and dedicated insurance investors and garner between 5 & 10% of equity on long-term incentive plans in exchange for pedigreed stewardship of capital in a start-up. Capital thus maintains 90% to 95% of the upside (less operating costs), symmetrically bearing the same downside. As with most externally-funded enterprises, it is Capital that reaps most (90 - 95%) of the the reward in the growth [if any] of the enterprise. This "split" is seen as reasonably sufficient to align Management's and Capital's interests, without creating undue agent-principal dilemmas, or grandiose empire-building endeavors.

Anchoring the other side, we have a hedge-fund model applied to a dedicated reinsurance risk-taker, such as that which London-based MAN recently purchased a portion. Here, Capital (i.e. the Investor) pays "one-and-something" plus a deeded 20% performance fee on the (net) upside, though bears the full burden of the downside-risk, albeit without performance fees. Perhaps there is also a high-water mark, for which one would need to review the PPM in detail, the presence of which increases the attractiveness over the course of the profit and loss of a full cycle. Capital placed at risk here has ALL the downside of the underwritten "risk", but none of the upside of the business growth. Here management receives a full 20% of immediate economic spoils and 100% of the business-growth options that arise from the successful stewarding of Capital ostensibly through wise portfolio management, prudent risk-management, and avoiding adverse risk, and undoubtedly a barge-full-'o-luck.

The obvious question arises as to precisely "why" the Capital funding a purposeful reinsurance company formation is able to obtain seemingly so much more of the upside (at the expense of management) with seemingly the same downside, than Capital investing in a reinsurance hedge fund. If it were a matter of a small difference, it would be a dull topic of conversation, and you might be watching "House" re-runs instead of reading this. But being that the order of magnitude of difference is so large, it demands an answer.

The first question should be: are we comparing "like with like"? Th answer is essentially is yes. Both are providing risk-capital to effectively underwrite reinsurance risk. Both are more or less dependent upon external events for realization of profit. Both use essentially the same standard industry modeling techniques (eg RMS). And both profit more (less) in hard (soft) markets respectively. There may exist subtle differences in risk selection, leverage, and portfolio management, but these are less important determinants in the scheme of things. Florida windstorm or California quake are essentially homogenuous risks.

So what is different that might possibly be used as an excuse to justify keeping all the business upside or yielding ALL of it in its entirety it to one's agent? Liquidity, for one, differs - at least on the surface. The commitment of insurance VC is not an annual event, whereas Capital in a reinsurance hedge fund can be withdrawn within stipulated guidelines, typically less onerous than VC lock-ups. Of course if you buy a share of a listed reinsurance company in the secondary market, there are no restrictions. In fact, the reinsurance hedge-fund might be "less liquid", by comparison. To be fair, buying risk through the trading of shares entails high market impact for sizable risk, but this too is reasonably manageable if spread across a portfolio.

Leverage and prudence may also differ. Katrina fatally blew-apart more than one catastrophe reinsurer - not because it was SOOO bad, but because management over-leveraged and under-diversified. In bridge and traders parlance it's called "shooting the moon". Most diversified, well run companies took hits and stomached the loss but it IS easier for the corporate entity to "reach" via leverage than the reinsurance investment manager who - without a proper balance sheet - well might face jail for a similar transgression. That is, of course, if he could a find a counterparty dullard enough to accept an under-capitalised promise for which there is no recourse...

Investment returns - premiums, excess capital, etc. provide another temptation for management not available to the reinsurance hedge fund. This could be good or bad, depending upon whether your investment pecadillo happens to be called "SCA" and Amaranth or its called "Paulson Global Opportunity Fund". On this front, many-a-reinsurance company has failed miserably in its pursuit of higher returns(hedge funds), non-core empire building (SCA), or social status hob-nobbing (Hollywood movie investment). Others however have soundly and soberly managed to earn higher returns than those available to just underwriting risk and placing it some collateralized trust structure. It is understandable for investors to desire to disentangle the two. However, IF one, for whatever reason, has investment alpha, the coorporate structure allows this to be better exploited resulting in higher returns overall to investors. However, the jury thus remains out on this front as to whose advantage this favours.

Cost structures are different. That is a major selling point of the hedge fund, vs. the largesse of corporate boards, Sarbox compliance, prima-dona underwriters, staff pensions costs, etc. But many costs are inherent in acquiring business to develop a more diversified risk book, and building an enterprise with depth, longevity, and redundancy that makes counterparty's feel safe, and allows more complex structures and risks to be assumed (presumably with better spreads) rather than merely marginally providing liquidity to a limited number of homogenous markets. Wining and dining, freebies, conferences, etc.fees, commissions, kickbacks all entice business, and senior people with relationships and expertise require meaningful compensation all which hits the bottom line. Moreover, these costs exist even in a disaster year where losses pile up due to the disaster or catastrophe-du-jour. One could argue that the Corporate's expense ratio is not dissimilar to "2&20" which might make one agnostic as to which structure one invests with. In reality, these "costs" are part-capex, and should build greater long-term value.  Yet, even IF the former were true, and one was indifferent, there is still the little chestnut about whether the business "optionality" should accrue to Management or Capital.

Transparency. Paradoxically, the HF structure provides MORE transparency than the corporate entity. Industry insiders say that a "clean reinsurer" is an oxymoron. There are only "less bad ones". Whether its the investment portfolio, or the current risk position, legacy risks, or malfeasance, one is never quite certain what's under hood. That said, there is no shortage of younger (both public and private cos. who are - relatively speaking - "clean", and there is nothing to prevent motivated capital from essentially setting up themselves (as Citadel, DE SHaw, and others have done), and cutting a deal with a capable management team.

While none of these reasons themselves are compelling, is there not something that explains it? For here where are today, with fine (not that I am qualified to pass this judgment) listed reinsurance companies trading at 5x forecast (and historical) earnings and up to 25% discounts to tangible book, solid management teams and well-operating infrastructures, existing relationships and books of business, and YET, MAN decides to buy into the other model, i.e. the hedge fund model, despite the seeming availability of BOTH the underwriting upside AND future enterprise appreciation upside, and do it at a reasonable discount too.

One possible answer might be - as queer and comical as it sounds - is that they simply have different investor bases. The corporates have smart, long-term, money who presumably value long-term growth and are willing to stomach illiquidity, volatility and discounts to book over the intermediate-term. The hedge fund model has investors that values one thing: "one-percent-per-month" in addition to the technicality that they often CAN ONLY INVEST IN HEDGE FUNDS, irrespective of how sub-optimal it may in comparison to investing in the same risk through a listed corporate. Yet another example of a local optimization problem. For the reinsurance HF investors are NOT irrational - just constrained, and a tad self-interested (yet another principal-agent dilemma). One can measureably sympathize with the investor who rolled the dice and bought a portfolio of listed reinsurers in 2007, which navigated the storm season and earthquake risk well, made ~18% returns on their equity except for the odd-ball who had monoline(s) exposure, YET their shareholders stomached negative mark-to-market returns (including dividends) despite the increases in book vals. But that was then, and this is now. When listed co's are trading at large prems to book, I can understand the aversion of opportunistic investors who just want the underwriting risk. But when they are cheap, very cheap, wisdom almost certainly favours the listed corporate, hands-down.

While the original question was "why would Capital not extract full potential rents from its existence, size and investment horizon?" perhaps I should lay that aside, and invert it into the more germane question which is: "IF the gulf is so wide, why would start or join a reinsurer when they could start a reinsurance hedge fund??!?!"

Tuesday, August 05, 2008

American ingenuity turning its attention to the credit crunch!

Just an Ordinary August Day

On a day when oil prices plummeted, P&G announced better-than-expected results from passing on higher prices to consumers, and the Fed did nothing, the relief rally that ensued did NOT witness Exxon-Mobil (the he largest company by market cap) turnover the most in value, nor P&G, nor Walmart, despite the S&P 500 Consumer Discretionary Index jumping the most, perhaps in the calculation life of the index. It wasn 't even the shorts falling over themselves to cover their shorts in Citicorp. Rather, it was Potash Corp of Saskatchewan, that Canadian province that makes Indiana look hilly, turning over almost twice the value of the next highest by value. Of course the talking heads will (after-the-fact) point to nebulous investor fears that fertilizer prices have peaked. But this isn't the real story. Potash - The Shares - are but a dog chewy-toy.

I believe the real story is - as I've written before inFeedback Trading's Hollow Victory, about the changing structure of the market: the evolution of momentum and feedback-trading strategies, the slaughtering of genuine liquidity providers, the morphing of former risk-trading capital into front-running order-sniffers, the Darwinian success (until mid-July) of momentum and trend-following strategies at the expense of value-oriented and contrarian pursuits and counter-trend programs. And as prophesized, the really interesting action begins when the Darwinian victors - having squeezed competitors to death - finding themselves atop the mountain - desire to exit. All the more so when, it happens in a pari-passu rush for the doors.

Maybe fertilizer have peaked. Maybe peak oil and increasing wealth in Asia will forever change the economics of energy-dependent agricultural inputs. Maybe as my friend Greg Newton at Naked Shorts suggests, the best cure for high prices is high prices. I actually haven't a clue. But I do know liquidation when I see it, and we ARE structural seeing a shake-out of the most egregious of the last 18-months of mimetically induced accumulations - irrespective of whatever the longer-term fundamental continuity of their underlying stories. Fat-tail indeed!!

Monday, August 04, 2008

When the Going Gets Tough, The Tough Get ... errr .... Handouts?

Mr Obama highlighted and lamented the fact that "We are addicted to foreign oil...."

The emphasis is mine, but it's strange to my sensibility. Is the API vetting his speeches? Are we not addicted to ALL oil - domestically produced as well? To energy writ-large? Are we actually addicted or are we simply callously clumsy and gluttonous in its use? Is it benign misuse or willful abuse?? Are we then addicted to its misuse? If we are addicted, should we go cold turkey, or use a patch? SO many questions. What did he mean?

But if we are addicted (and both President Bush and Sen Obama have used the same terminology) WTF is it with the pandering about releasing oil from the SPR, and gas-tax holidays (note to Mr Obama: this language could be misconstrued! -ed.) and the windfall Oil Co Tax-->$1000/head gift?? Either you're addicted or you're not, and if we ARE, it's rather irresponsible for our leaders to be suggesting that The State show up at the AA meeting with kegs-o-beer and a waitress from the tequila bar with bottles in her holster, limes, and a some shooters.

Are high prices the only thing that will change consumptive behaviour? If so, and The People have admitted they have a problem why don't The People (like every other civilized nation that understands the meaning of e-x-t-e-r-n-a-l-i-t-y)? agree to keep the prices HIGH to help themselves avoid imported oil temptation and let prevailing (post tax) price provide the adequate incentives to re-tool and invest in more homegrown (no pun intended) alternatives? And while you laugh at the thought of The People voluntarily taxing themselves at a HIGHER rate, consider that as recent as 2006, the Germans (and the right-wing conservative Christian Democrats to boot!!), in the world's model of social democracy, had little difficulty raising their [regressive] VAT by 3% to fund required/desired spending - a central plank in now-PM Angela Merkel's campaign if I recall correctly. And it was met, for the most part, with a stoicism that should shame virtually every American, considering that German property prices - even in 2006 where little changed from where they were nearly a decade-and-half prior. The difference in financial sobriety, and sense of social responsibility from the contrast in how the two societies react when things are tough, makes me wonder how America would react (in modernity) if things get really tough. Margaret Atwood may turn out to be prophetic...

If Your Stock Goes Down, It MUST Be Short-Sellers

IF one is the chief a monoline, bank or other financial holding company with large dubious asset-backed positions, it is understandable that during the denial phase of coming to terms with one's fate, that one would like to blame the nefarious Short Sellers. We'll ignore the asymmetry of absent blame on the way up for momentum traders, and concentrated hedge and mutual fund accumulations.

But today's short-seller whinge-ing award comes from the most unlikely of sources in the most unlikely of sectors: Australia's richest man, none other than John "Twiggy" Forrest, chairman and founder of emerging iron-ore behemoth, Fortescue Metals Pty. (ticker FMG AU Equity for Bloombergers).

According to today's Sydney Morning Herald,
Iron ore miner Fortescue Metals Group Ltd, headed by Mr Forrest, has being targeted by hedge funds resulting in a more than one third fall in the company's value over the past six weeks.

The activity has also cut Mr Forrest's paper fortune in Fortescue since hedge funds began targeting the stock when it was trading at a high of $13.15 a share on June 25.

"Those people who make a living out of short selling stocks ... are bordering on criminality," Mr Forrest told delegates on Monday at the Diggers and Dealers conference in Kalgoorlie, Western Australia.
No matter that FMG (seen in chart above) vaulted more than 115% from A$6 to A$13 in the current YTD, punctuated by an unusually firm End-of-Quarter-2 close, nor that it had increased more than 900% since Jan 1, 2007.

The SMH continued:
"Those stock market players who have no interest in the company, who spread or propagate rumours that they haven't been bothered to check ... and then sell into the back of those rumours, I don't think they're doing anyone any good," Mr Forrest said.

"And of course, when we hear that we've got cracks in the bottom of our ore cars, or even a ship has sunk at the berth.

"We know those things are being put out to scare the mums and dads into selling their shares and of course the people who've shorted their shares then go and buy those shares off."

Mr Forrest also attacked investment banks who defended the practice.

"The investment banks who defend short selling are defending real personal interest," he said.
Mr Forrest, of course, is not in any way defending his personal real interest with his accusations. After all his mark-to-market wealth of Fortescue shares alone only declined a mere A$4 billion to A$8 billion. And while Mr Forrest's faux-concern for little Bruces & Sheilas across oz is heart-warming, by way of full disclosure, most of FMG stock is locked up between himself, Steinberg's Leucadia, Falcone's Harbinger, whom together control @63%. Perhaps, one of the other big-three is hedging out the enormous gains of the prior 18 months, particularly as bottom falls out from under US economic activity in general, and the commodity complex in particular.

In any case, I am not defending short sellers. Nor making any statement about whether FMG's share price is too high or too low. But I remain intrigued by the ease and rapidity that longs unsheath their asymmetrical insinuations that anything which goes down - even something that has appreciated as outrageously as Fortescue - even something with some serious logistical issues which remain to resolved - must have a nefarious connection...and is not the result of ordinary profit-taking, trend-followers reversing positions, or principled value investors using it to hedge the market risk of other, now-less-exuberantly valued miners, in currencies less susceptible to carry-unwind risk.

I wonder if Mr Forrest is buying more down here from The Short Sellers, particularly if such a fall is as unwarranted as he suggests? Last official filings, however, showed him selling a cool A$40million of stock during the prior quarter...

Saturday, August 02, 2008

Revisiting Increases in the Bankruptcy Filing Rate

For those who missed it last week, University of Illinois law prof Robert Lawless at Credit Slips posted a nice colourful update to YoY changes in US (personal - I presume) Bankruptcy Filings, state-by-state, along with a table rank-ordering the data. As one might expect, a year into crunchy credit coincidental to @$125 oil, vaulting coal prices, and 50% rises in many softs, the credit-sensitive states are ignominiously on top, with energy and ag states at the bottom. Using my own powers of visual agglomeration, there appears (make what you will of it) to be a decided red-state/blue-state schism to the changes.

Compare (or contrast) this to Business Bankruptcies posted and discussed in the Big Picture a few days ago. While there is some reasonable overlap, Lawless' pictograph is more indicative of housing distress, and his discussion perhaps more reflective of the actual flashpoints across the country.

What Do the Germans Think of Obama?

(cross-posted at Naked Capitalism)

Following a whirlwind global tour, US media coverage would have one believe that Mr Obama had wowed Europe's most important nation. However, a close look by Der Spielgel at German reactions to Obama suggests they are rather cautious and less then-than-enthusiastic across the German political spectrum, though for far different reasons than American skeptics. Why? 'Continuation of The War on Terror' rhetoric and its implied obligations along with an expectation of increased commitments to Afghanistan are seemingly their prime concerns. Read the entire article in Der Spiegel's Obama Summary
(hat tip to Ben Carliner)