Monday, May 28, 2007

The Cloud in Every Silver Lining


One would be challenged in the current epoch to find an asset or asset class outside of Zimbabwean bonds (do they even exist?)and the US Dollar, that has not left the fixed-orbit of earthly price action towards some higher interstellar plane. Even troubled Lebanon and its equity market is appreciating nearly 1% per month.

Only in Venezuela where a populist elected leader is nationalizing assets at a prodigious clip driving the nation's equity index down well into double digits are investors seemingly cautious in their enthusiam. The other oddity in this unprecedented bull-run for assets is the Japanese flotsam and jetsam represented by the MOTHERS (-24% ytd), Osaka Hercules (-19.7% ytd), and to a lesser but no means happy extent, the JASDAQ (-8.4% ytd). , from the perspective of the USD investor, which is the financial benchmark equivalent of the No Child Left Behind Act.

And just as the asset bull has been dramatically accelerating its rampage since 2005, so too has the carnage here been inversely accelerating! The pictures speak for themselves. Now running the risk of being immodest, I was rather vocal to my warnings to investors to insure they scrutinize their allocations accordingly, for the peak of the TSE Mothers and Osaka Hercules coincided with the trough in large cap relative performance, and the denoument of Daiko Henjo, and was based on the flimsiest of growth stories, and all manner of "weight of money" market shenannigans. Now, at a trailing prc/sls of 0.81x and less than 8x trailing p/ebitda and p/cf, and 22x nominal earnings, the excesses are gone. And there are a number of interesting, growing enterprises that Monhanram could ferret out, and some value situations that Piotroski too would find interesting.

So while no bottom has been printed, the time has come to begin to search through the rubble more closely, for when general interest (and money, for which at present there is no shortage) returns, the first 50% will disappear in the blink of an eye.

Friday, May 25, 2007

Katy Lied

Sting popularized it as "synchronicity" defined more precisely as a coincidence of events that are [seemingly] meaningfully related. Such was my feeling this morning listening to (at the risk of revealing my age and musical taste) Steely Dan's "Katy Lied".

First as my coffee brewing device came to finish, came:
BLACK FRIDAY

When Black Friday comes
I'll stand down by the door
And catch the grey men when they
Dive from the fourteenth floor
When Black Friday comes
I'll collect everything I'm owed
And before my friends find out
I'll be on the road
When Black Friday falls you know it's got to be
Don't let it fall on me


OK, so this is not so strange, Friday's come one-in-seven and today just happens to be the day before the weekend.

Next came "Bad Sneakers" conjuring up images of enrequited profit from my short position in Asics (TSE Code 7936). Then while I am thinking about how I've covered my Toyota shorts, track 4, starting haranguing:

DADDY DON'T LIVE IN THAT NEW YORK CITY NO MORE

Daddy don't live in that New York City
No more
He don't celebrate Sunday on a Saturday night
No more
Daddy don't need no lock and key
For the piece he stowed
Out on Avenue D
Daddy don't live in that New York City
No more

Daddy don't drive in that Eldorado
No more
He don't travel on down to the neighborhood
Liquor store
Lucy still loves her coke and rum
But she sits alone
'Cause her daddy can't come
Daddy don't drive in that Eldorado
No more


Now, not only is Daddy not driving an El Dorado, but fewer and fewer are driving GM, F, or Chrysler for that matter.

Track 5 is the humdinger, for as I begin chomping on my croissant wishing I was a fly on the wall in the Paulson's strategic talks with the Chinese Vice-Premier arrives...
DR WU

Katy tried
I was halfway crucified
I was on the other side
Of no tomorrow
You walked in
And my life began again
Just when I'd spent the last piaster
I could borrow
All night long
We would sing that stupid song
And every word we sang
I knew was true

Are you with me Doctor Wu
Are you really just a shadow
Of the man that I once knew
Are you crazy are you high
Or just an ordinary guy
Have you done all you can do
Are you with me Doctor

Don't seem right
I've been strung out here all night
I've been waiting for the taste
You said you'd bring to me
Biscayne Bay
Where the Cuban gentlemen sleep all day
I went searching for the song
You used to sing to me
Katy lies
You could see it in her eyes
But imagine my surprise
When I saw you

Are you with me Doctor Wu
Are you really just a shadow
Of the man that I once knew
She is lovely yes she's sly
And you're an ordinary guy
Has she finally got to you
Can you hear me Doctor


Yea, I know Fagan was talking about a different Doctor Wu but the lyrics are not far off and seemingly have some relevance to the Madame Wu now in DC.

Still in disbelief about the seeming coincidences, I open my paper and wish I was in Cannes as I read about the Glitterati attending the festival when Track 6, "Everyone's Gone To The Movies" begins blaring from my speakers.

But now, I am wondering whether today is going to be as bizarre as they come. So I dropped everything I was meant to do, lazed on the sofa, closed my eyes, and drank in the last four songs which are some of the most masterful compositions written...
YOUR GOLD TEETH II

Who are these children
Who scheme and run wild
Who speak with their wings
And the way that they smile
What are the secrets
They trace in the sky
And why do you tremble
Each time they ride by

CHORUS:
Throw out your gold teeth
And see how they roll
The answer they reveal
Life is unreal

Who are these strangers
Who pass through the door
Who cover your action
And go you one more
If you're feeling lucky
You best not refuse
It's your game the rules
Are your own win or lose


CHAIN LIGHTNING

Some turnout, a hundred grand
Get with it we'll shake his hand
Don't bother to understand
Don't question the little man
Be part of the brotherhood
Yes it's chain lightning
It feels so good

Hush brother, we cross the square
Act natural like you don't care
Turn slowly and comb your hair
Don't trouble the midnight air
We're standing just where he stood
It was chain lightning
It feels so good

ANY WORLD (THAT I'M WELCOME TO)

If I had my way
I would move to another lifetime
I'd quit my job
Ride the train through the misty nighttime
I'll be ready when my feet touch ground
Wherever I come down
And if the folks will have me
Then they'll have me

CHORUS:
Any world that I'm welcome to
Is better than the one I come from

I can hear your words
When you speak of what you are and have seen
I can see your hand
Reaching out through a shining daydream
Where the days and nights are not the same
Captured happy in a picture frame
Honey I will be there
Yes I'll be there

CHORUS

I got this thing inside me
That's got to find a place to hide me
I only know I must obey
This feeling I can't explain away

I think I'll go to the park
Watch the children playing
Perhaps I'll find in my head
What my heart is saying
A vision of a child returning
A kingdom where the sky is burning
Honey I will be there
Yes I'll be there


THROW BACK THE LITTLE ONES

Lost in the Barrio I walk like an Injun
So Carlo won't suspect something's wrong here
I dance in place
And paint my face
And act like I belong here

CHORUS:
Throw back the little ones
And pan-fry the big ones
Use tact, poise and reason
And gently squeeze them

Hot licks and rhetoric
Don't count much for nothing
Be glad if you can use what you borrow
So I pawn my crown
For a ride uptown
And buy it back tomorrow

CHORUS

Done like a matador I pray for the weekend
And hope the little girls still throw roses
Else I'll change my bait
And move upstate
Before the season closes

Wednesday, May 23, 2007

Warning: Retail Japan Short Hundred Trillion Yen

Bloomberg reports here today that recent data suggests that there is nearly YEN 100 trillion in leveraged FX trading originating from Japanese retail, presumably in one form of short YEN or another. OK so some of it is an extremely short-term speculative alternative to pachislo .

Nonetheless, if ever there was a reason for a large, counter-trend move, herds of Japanese retail finding themselves pari-passu in a hihgly leveraged trade would clearly be at or near the top of the list.

Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Breaking News! SAFE expands with new hires...



Beijing (AP). In breaking news today, China's State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced that it was beefing up its investment team with some new hires. This follows rapidly on the heels of its announcement that it will take a USD$3 billion stake in Stephen Schwarzman's private equity powerhouse, Blackstone Group.

The new hires, Mssrs Sherman & Peabody, are well-known faces to more experienced and wiser financial market professionals, having been in the spotlight and won numerous awards over the years, especially when most professional were cutting their teeth. Deputy Administrator Li Dongrong said that "Their vision, experience, adventursome spirits, and innovative tools (probably referring to Mr Peabody's "Time Machine" and "Magic Blackboard") will be invaluable to SAFE's ongoing investment efforts.

When interviewed about the career change, Mr Sherman was quoted tersely as saying "If anyone can fix it, Mr Peabody can!".

Friday, May 18, 2007

Dear Mr Market



Dear Mr Market,

I understand that you are busy and that you've a lot on your plate, but I was wondering what precisely you meant by the recent weakness in real estate (see above chart). Did you mean that the economy will will be softening and so future rent and capital value increases will necessarily be limited, OR did you mean growth and liquidity will continue unchecked and so inflation will be HIGHER and thus interest rates will rise hurting relative values, even for the bluest of bluechip portfolios such as BXP's(see below).

Your insights would be helpful for if real estate has stopped being an anti-dollar hedge, then surely some people should told.

(always) Respectfully Yours,

"Cassandra"

(P.S. - I do realize it's expiry friday and that it just might be fun & games for sport & profit, but confirmation would help)

Friday, May 11, 2007

The Spread Police (Comments now allowed)


If you've been lamenting the under-performance of your favorite Japanese equity market index (like MacroMan and other foreign punters), imagine the frustration of those who have NOT not hedged their currency exposure. As it stands, the Japanese equity returns in dollars (see above left chart of MSCI-Japan) has yielded little in nominal terms over the past 18 months. More interesting, is the inverse correlation over the past 18 months, which has been volatility-snuffingly high. And while the strength of the inverse correlation may be new, the lack of return to the Nikkei in USDs over the long term is not (as depicted right).

Returning back to my main point, the inverse correlation between the USD/YEN and the Japanese benchmark equity-index-of-choice is truly uncanny. It is as if some secret order maybe the The Spread Police have been contracted to watch over every tick in order to insure that none are errant, and so that said relationship is not jostled free by emboldened feedback-trading trendfollowers searching for sufficient change impulse.

Now, if they in fact, existed, who, or what, would these "spread police" actually resemble?? Would they have families? Would they acknowledge their profession? Who would pay them?

Might they look like this?:


or perhaps this?:


Or what about....:



....this???


My spouse suggested...


My 5yo son assures me that they are...



Those who think it is a more nefarious, 2nd-order effect might think this:



At first, I thought...


Though after much rumination, my best guess, was more umm ... errr .... mechanized....



But in all earnestness, what has caused the Topix vs. USD/JPY relationship to be caught in this financial "eddy" for the past 17 months? For it hasn't alway been so, as seen in the long-term chart of the Topix in USDs in the second graph from the top. Of course, there remains a measureably-large dollar sensitivity amongst the shares of the largest enterprises many of whom indeed depend upon US exports and world trade, historically overly-dependant upon the strength of the USD. But this reality has existed nearly since I cut my wisdom teeth, so why now??

And one would be forgiven for considering ZIRP & nearZIRP as the culprit, though it too is almost a decade old and has seen both currency moves and index moves that has swamped the relationship. So why so little vol? While William of Occam would no doubt attribute it to that which is most likely - the fact that not even gaijin equity investors, be they pension funds or central banks, want to hold YEN thanks to ZIRP - the lack of certainty is making me edgy. For low vol periods in high-vol instruments and the apparent relationships that causes them is making me feel decidedly unsettled.

(BTW - for those admiring the chinese-looking "soldiers", they are in fact North Korean border guards "walking the line" as Jack Nicholson said in "A ew Good Men", or in this case, sitting on the wall. I used it not to intentionally mislead, but just because I liked the pic! -C-.)

Tuesday, May 08, 2007

Man of Steel


A South Korean newspaper managed to snap & publish photographs of heretofore camera-shy, activist, buccaneer, and Steel Partners founder, Warren Lichtenstein while he was attending the KT&G AGM recently.

To a certain extent I admire Steel's activities in Japan, for they had shined a deserved spotlight upon the low-hanging deep-value fruit that was present in Japan. And indeed they've pointed out the under-leveraged, and sub-optimal capital structures of many Japanese enterprises.

At the moment, however, while I admire Mr Lichtenstein's efforts, I do not envy his investors, for while the investment manager has indeed collected meaningful performance fees AFTER the share prices of portfolio companies have been ramped-up, investors currently face a less pleasant situation of owning a portfolio of pedestrian, less-than-liquid and undervalued-no-more companies, the exit from which will more perhaps even problematical than it was for Mr Lichtenstein to slip away from the AGM without getting his photo snapped.

Bold Imagination


I like bold forecasts. Particularly predictions that employ large quantities of imagination, that look beyond the present to big figures far-departed from prevailing price levels. And yesterday, sober, often-prescient, Canadian stalwart, The BCA (The Bank Credit Analyst) did precisely thus, by predicting that Euro-Yen is enroute to YEN180 per solitary Euro.

They say that despite the impressive 80% apreciation since the bottoming of the Euro in 2000, more is in store. They say:
As we have previously highlighted, the ECB will continue to raise rates, which will underpin the euro heading forward. In sharp contrast, Japanese interest rates will not move higher as the country battles with deflation, and the economic data remains soft. Should the euro eventually break up through its previous high and head towards 1.4500, as expected by our Foreign Exchange Strategy service, and the yen holds relatively steady, the cross could get close to 180.00 and test previous highs set in the early 1990s.

Far be it from me to disagree on a lark. For I do understand that in the game of currency-market "rock-paper-scissors", relative interest rates and the bias of change thereto trumps the theoretically important aspects of trade account balance and current account balance. From this perspective, despite mighty mercantile Japan's persistent trade and current account surpluses over the past two decades, negligible unemployment, proximity to the greatest growth conjurer that the world has EVER seen, and the phenomenal accomplishments of Japanese multinational enterprises in terms of technological and market dominance, the MoF has accomplished "plenty much" through ZIRP and fiscal disabusement: They've deterred anyone and everyone from holding or bidding for YEN, including the vast majority of their own citizenry, who Bloomberg reported today now own more mutual funds with non-Japanese assets than mutual funds withn Japanese assets. This is, from the perspective of bureaucrats, a policy triumph equivalent to bringing down the Soviet Union.

Before one picks up the phone and shorts the YEN for EUR, I would point out two things. First, the demise of the Soviet Union was to some extent accidental, since the Reagan build that ostensibly bankrupted the evil empire was itself based upon flawed intelligence intercepted from the Russkies who were essentially fabricating Russia's own military-industrial infrastructure acquisition and troop-strength facts and figures to their own leadership, something American intelligence didn't consider when embarking upon their own 80s build. Secondly, Euro-Yen has been the bane of large macro traders and carried out many in 1998, and after. Now, they are requited, but short YEN IS crowded both explicitly (by financing carry trades) and implicitly, by the Bloomberg figures of Japanese capital obviously (and copiously) flowing abroad.

BCA things nothing will upset the proverbial apple cart, send the cross to 180. They may be right, but many other things must also go right and smoothly for this bold prediction to come to fruition.

Thursday, May 03, 2007

Not-so-Chinese Whispers

So the stock is rising for "no apparent reason". "It's noise", says the naive reversion trader or overconfident short-seller. Maybe someone knows something. Knows something indeed!!! Bloomberg reported today that a NY-based investment banker within the energy group at Credit Suisse (and friends) were taking advantage of precisely such Fat Chance to profit handsomely from their privileged information. Soon, however, he'll be surfing porn at the US Federal minimum security prison at Allenwood.

The list of deals that he and his friends are accused of capitalising upon is long, and the profits large indeed. He told friends and business partners, they told others, trades were placed, leaving a trail of landline and cell-phone records. But what was he thinking? After the effort that the SEC put into trying to get Martha Stewart make the pen more "homey", did he believe they were now too preoccupied with terrorism? Really! Consider the effort that Ashcroft put into screwing harmless pot-head Tommy Chong.

As result, Credit Suisse now has egg on their face for hiring and promoting such an idiot who got caught badly, without any form plausible deniability. And make no mistake: the real surprise here is how stupid he was for someone 37 years old and in the business for a long time, and that he got caught. OK, so he was not a WASP American, but still, "what was he thinking?!?!?" For everyday. CFOs, analysts, hedge-fund & portfolio managers, non-executive directors, syndicate desks, financial printers, lawyers, legal assistants, journalists, TV talking heads, SEC registration clerks, cleaners, and all their friends, relations, acquaintances and people they want to impress are acting mmaterial non-public information within the public markets, whether about secondary offerings, earnings torpedoes, takeovers, buybacks, mergers etc.

So that emerging price move, with emerging volume change, sans information might just be noise. But the odds are that someone has information that YOU don't and is acting upon it, either directly or indirectly in the market.

Tuesday, May 01, 2007

Fair & Balanced ?


Perhaps the only conceivable thing worse than the Wall Street Journal is a Wall Street Journal owned by Fair & Balanced parent, Newscorp. Such would be case if today's reported marriage were to be consummated.

I have always been partial to the pink sheets of Pearson's Financial Times. I took the habit as a student in US, at the height of the Eurodollar market boom, and continued as a student in the UK, despite the fact that the pink pages were deeply unfashionable amongst the crowd with which I was running and the professors with whom I was studying, most of had a Guardian or Workers Daily under their arm. Nonetheless, despite the unfashionable-ness, I thought it firmly "centrist", and not nearly as obnoxious as The Economist, at the time.

The Financial Times did, and still does, deliver the dry facts. They have no need to pepper the news or op-ed with ideological diatribes, for their readers knew their class and by extension their classes interests. There were few fence sitters in their audience. I appreciated this, for I was keenly independent in thought and found the Wall Street Journal's slant rather vile and insidious. I understood shy they thought it necessary for in America, "class" was primarily economic, far more amorphous, the associated politics more resembled the shifting sands of the Sahara. This meant that there many fence sitters, working-class by birth, middle-class by education, and perhaps upper-middle by profession. They were inherently conflicted and presumably could be swayed by persuasive ideological argument, and/or cynically bent reporting, or deeply ideological op-ed rants.

Today, I still read the Financial Times. And for the most part, they remain "centrist" in the political-economy of their editorial stance (though they've sold out to "the Suits", of late, caving in to vulgarity and the crassest of consumption with their "How To Spend It" and "Property" inserts). But the thought of a Wall Street Journal owned by Murdoch & Co. is, I must reveal, a rather depressing one. As if CNBC's bubblevision weren't sufficiently theatrical with talking heads Kudlow, Cramer, Perky Bartiromo, and their two-minute interviews with the "movers, shakers, and "hot-hands", we know must countenance "Fair & Balanced" in Finance. No more recession. No more pessimism. Your either with us or against us. Bullishness or broker. Bears, skeptics, cyncics, pessimists and maybe even just those this a valid and correct (by contrary) point of view, kind of like France and Germany during the Iraq war will now be ridiculed in print, and in the op-ed. As a result, if consummated, we will have to assign "contrarianism", like Communism before it, to the dustbin of history....ne c'est pas?

Thursday, April 26, 2007

Psalm 25-and-one-half


This little prayer recently discovered in that most obscure of scrolls: "The Book of Financial Psalms"

Psalm 25-and-One-Half

 1[a] To you, O LIQUIDITY, I open up my blotter and go long;

 2 for in you I trust, O Liquidity.
       Do not let me be put to shame,
       nor let The Bears or creditors triumph over me.

 3 No one whose hope (and position) is by you
       will ever be put to shame,
       but the holders of cash, and the unlevered will be put to shame
       for they ignore opportunity without excuse.

 4 Show me your ways, O LQUIDITY,
       teach me your many paths to profit: precious metals, commodities, equities, art, real estate, antiques

 5 guide me in your bounty and teach me gearing, and to love low cap rates and to not fear inflation
       for you are Liquidity my Savior,
       and my hope is in you all day long.

 6 Remember, O Liquidity, your power and will,
       for they make me bold.

 7 Remember not the sins of my youth
       and my rebellious ways;
       when I was bearish and full of doubt,
       for you are good, O LIQUIDITY.

 8 Good and upright is LIQUIDITY;
       for IT instructs pessimists to follow ITS ways.

 9 IT guides the humble in what is right
       and teaches them to borrow and never go short of stock.

 10 All the ways of the LIQUIDITY are giving and keep giving
       for those who keep to the demands of his covenant and don't go short, hold cash, or buy bonds.

 11 For the sake of your name, O LIQUIDITY,
       forgive my past cautiousness, for it was unwise.

 12 Who, then, is the man that fears the LIQUIDITY ?
       IT will instruct him in the way chosen for him.

 13 He will spend his days in prosperity,
       and his descendants will inherit the land, Shares, and Gulfstream-V.

 14 LIQUIDITY spanks those who fear him;
       he insures the levered's debt covenants are not violated, and that CDOs remain nominally solvent

 15 My eyes are ever on LIQUIDITY,
       for only IT will release my house from creditors.

 16 Turn to me and be gracious to me,
       for I am worthy and leveraged.

 17 The troubles of my loans have multiplied;
       free me from my margin calls.

 18 Look upon my affliction and my distress
       and lift-up all my underwater positions.

 19 See how Central Bank reserves have increased
       and how their coffers fill. Help them too!

 20 Guard my portfolio and rescue my positions;
       let me not be put to shame, and see my investors redeem
       for I take refuge in you.

 21 May leverage and beta protect me,
       because my hope is in you.

 22 Redeem NOT, dear investors, have faith in LIQUIDITY,
       IT will save us from all our troubles!

Footnotes:

  1. Psalm 25:and-one-half This psalm is a translated acrostic poem, the verses of which begin with the successive letters of the Hebrew alphabet.



Farewell Kato


I have been waiting a year-and-a-half to find some way of working Peter Seller's sidekick, Kato, into this blog, who apart from being very amusing is consistent with my predisposition towards always being on the lookout for something that might blindside me. Now, with the clarification of just how cooked the books Katokichi Company's (TSE Code #2873) books actually were, founding family member and now-former President Yoshikazu Kato has decided to fall on his sword (metaphorically speaking, that is) and stepp down.

The total amount of faked sales were estimated at USD$1bn over the previous 6 years, reasonably in excess of initial estimates and amounting to somewhere between 5 and 10% of annual company sales. While I believe there will be phoenix-like value emerging from the ashes, I do believe that the eventual restatement of prior years' accounts will keep on a lid on things and cause further price distribution from liquidation and so would take any meager short-term profits, and as the old saw goes, get out of Dodge...

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Thrice Lucky?


Thrice lucky. That must be the motto of Osamu Kaneko hard-nosed ebullient founder and President of real estate advisory and management firm Da Vinci Advisors KK (TSE Code 4314), now with a market cap of YEN 175bn, and Mr Kaneko still holding 25%. Not bad for a company with no sales in 2004. Such is the power of using leveraged finance in the acquisition of real assets.

But it wasn;t always so, as the title of this post - "thrice lucky" - suggests. For Mr Kaneko spent the 1970s and bubble years with Bubble-King themselves, Haseko Construction (TSE Code #1808), as head of their US ops. From first-hand experience, I can recall Haseko's presence in the Japanese enclave of Fort Lee, NJ cynically known as "Fort Ree", to the working class lads of Edgewater (pronounced "Ej-wooda" to purists ), during the height of the last US real estate bubble in late 80's. They had constructed several monstrous towers majestically atop the hills overlooking the Hudson. Unfortunately, it was at a time when many others had done precisely the same, only sooner, while others were still in the process of doing the same, many of whom would never finish. Whether this project was their undoing, or the acquisition of Japanese land at never-to-be-seen-again prices, Haseko, as it was, is, no more. Strike-one!

Next, in the 1990s, came "Sunterra", the self-proclaimed King of time-shares, arising out of the ashes of Signature Resorts, whereupon Osamu (affectionately known as "Sammy") was Chairman. Maybe its cultural, maybe its my occasional unabashed snobbishness, but there is something about "time-shares" that creeps me out. Maybe its because I like my own space. Maybe its because I my economic sensibilities are offended when someone parcels up something as pedestrian as an apartment, and peddles for 300 to 500% of face. I thought hotels exist for this purpose, and to this day fail to see the allure of the timeshare. But Sammy was the timeshare King, with all the Radio Pyongyang prognostications about growth, value, ideas, blah blah, until in 1999 things went horribly pear-shaped, leading to eventual Chapter-11, and shareholder lawsuits. Strike Two.

In 1998, perhaps because Sammy knew more than he told to the unfortunate Sunterra shareholders of the time, he extricated himself from day-to-day management oversight, and founded Da Vinci KK, eventually IPO-ing in Dec 2001. While he needed to wait a couple of years before property values bottomed following the collapse of the bubble, cleaning up and recap of the banks, and the return of foreign carpet-baggers to Japan, the phrase "being in the right place at the right time" was rarely more apt. Inheritance law changes, asset sales and de-leveraging by all manner of corporations, securitisation and emergence of REITs, all happened in a relatively short period of time culminating in the launch of large managed fund that would secure steady management fees for years to come once the funds were deployed. Coincidental to this was one of THE most spectacular post-bubble ramps seen in Japan with DavVinci's share price vaulting ten-fold from YEN20,000 to YEN 200,000 during CY 2005, including a 4th quarter leap from YEN 60,000 to 200,000!! This assault was led by JP Morgan who, in the market, had amassed more than 20% of the outstanding shares that represented perhaps one-half of the float. Such is the power of the largest marginal investor, they it must be said that by mid December one retail mania had gotten hold of the theme, they presciently sold more than half of their monstrous position very near the top.

But this is history, left for the reader to make his or her own judgments. What has my attention today is that an apparent DaVinci subsidiary has been active in the secondary markets, acquiring a 10% position in the Ohtani's TOC (through presumed Davinci sub Algrave YK), and vocally opposing the ostensible YEN 800/share "take-under" from the family (see yesterday's poetical epitaph). Today, DaVinci offered YEN 1100/share for the same. Note that the Ohtani's have the effective control of TOC, though their take-under offer was apparently so insulting, and left so much juice, they will likely be required to pay-up in order to take it private, and there remains the possibility of other bidders emerging.

But perhaps for non-merger arbs, looking forward, it is more interesting to note that the same DaVinci vehicle, Algarve YK, that is spoiling the Ohtani's party, has also emerged as the holder of 9%+ stake of asset-rich Toei Corp (TSE Code# 9605) which in addition to its large holdings of TV Asahi and Toei Animation (equal to 40% of current market cap), owns a very large and reasonably valuable film library of Japanese animation and a massive amount of under-valued and under utilized real estate through out Tokyo in the form of offices and movie theatres. Presumably, Sammy sees what asset-investors have seen for the better part of a decade: the break-up value inherent in a number of venerable asset-rich companies. Whether an iconolastic outsider from Indiana State University with a chequered past will be more successful than those before are IMHO even-odds at best, but those are much better than one would have gotten from the bookies at any time in the past.

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Farewell TOC

So farewell
then TOC
TSE# 8841,
land-lord,
linen-lord,
and would-be
lord of
health-tonics.

As a listed
company,
you always
traded cheap,
never
getting
the respect you
deserved.

Now,
With a TOB price
equal to a 5.5% cap rate,
you'll be remembered
as having been
"taken-under"
by the Otani's
rather than
"taken-over".

(with apologies to EJ Thribb, aged 5-1/2)

Friday, April 20, 2007

Katokichi: Cooking the Books?


In most other developed markets (and many emerging ones) major league fraud would spawn hundreds of news articles and much hand-wringing searching for culpability from janitors to auditors. Katokichi Co Ltd. (TSE Code# 2873) food manufacturer and distributor of frozen convenience foods, and owners/operators of variously-themed restaurants and pubs admitted recently ((see Yomiuri article here to (no pun intended) cooking the books. Katokichi has long stood out as a steady and profitable grower in an otherwise moribund sector, that, for the most part, has rather limited international growth and appeal. For despite the international popularity of sushi, none of Japan’s “ceremonial rice cake” makers, or “natto” (peculiarly foul-tasting fermented bean paste adjacently pictured) have succeeded in landing that contract with Whole Foods, WalMart, of WuMart, thus transforming themselves into the much sought-after secular growth company that, it would seem, so enamors foreign hedge fund investors.

In respect of the book-diddling at hand, Katokichi apparently fabricated sales transactions and related invoices between affiliated companies in a carousel fraud over a period of three years, to the tune of up to YEN20 billion gross sales per year, presumably in a bid to window-dress firm sales and profits (although it remains possible, pending investigation, that it was a scheme for parochial enrichment). At the top-line, this is a drop in the bucket for a co with YEN350 billion of sales, though it is potentially very meaningful at approx 3x the company’s reported net profits which were in the vicinity of YEN6.5 billion, hence the reaction of the firm’s share price (see chart left relative to the TOPIX). The company said: “it’s investigating and can’t comment”. Un-named sources, according to the Yomiuri daily suggested the amounts of false profit or fabricated indebtedness were negligible relative to aggregate turnover and recent firm net profit levels, though such intimations were apparently insufficient to prevent almost half the float from changing hands in the ensuing three weeks to date.

So while disclosure is far from sufficient, fear of roaches is now, an international phenomenon. Dump first, ask questions later. Such fear however, has, despite the potential for more ugliness, created an interesting opportunity to acquire interests in one of the few growing, successful, diversified food manufacturing and distribution business at a nice discount to peers, absolute historical valuation, peer-relative valuation, and probably a 30% discount to prevailing fair value, with a now-diminished foreign ownership ratio.

Feeling brave?

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Thinner than Gruel

Attention all Japanese Equity Fund Managers: If you are outperforming the index, then you are incredibly lucky; have a narrow, cap-weighted portfolio; or are incredibly lucky AND have a cap-weighted narrow portfolio. There is almost nothing credible in between. This is highlighted by the implausibly low percentage (less than 25% as of 2nd week of April) of stocks outperforming either the Nikkei or TOPIX First Section on a rolling 12 month basis.

While good news for disciples of the MSCI Japan Index, and even better news for those prescient enough to make the TOPIX Large 70 their index of choice, this is decidedly BAD news for broader indexers, slaves to more inclusive benchmarks, as well as those with purely small and mid-cap mandates. Now, my data is reasonably good and extensive, going back to the early 1980s, and such widespread under-performance is historically unprecedented. Unprecedented BOTH in absolute percentage terms (less 25%) and for the duration of time (> 2-1/4 years) that the percentage has been deteriorating enroute to its current depths.

Now this may be as it should. Many of Japan's largest enterprises happen also have global, rather than purely domestic, markets, and benefit from the labour supply shocks boosting transnational enterprise profitability. Sales growth on one side coupled with cost relief on the other is, it must be said, virtuous for investors, in comparison to the obverse.

But before ye lucky ones start patting each other on the backs and spending one's accrued, but uncrystallized performance fees, I must be point out that this Golden Era Of The Large Cap, of the Most Deserved Enterprises In Japan, also happens to coincide with the period in which East Asian Surplus Capital - both Japanese and Chinese and others, has been flowing uphill to ostensibly finance the Americaland in its rather errrr unsustainable consumptive binge. And as a "Cassandra", I will give fair warning that the last time "The Deserving Few" shone so brightly, so too did they violently and terrorizingly under-perform for not less than a full Calendar year.

Despite however despicable some might find the YEN, (and make no mistake, there are no shortage of reasons) the Yen WILL become untethered from USD in spectacular fashion, and in the process crucify those with implied short yen bet buried within their "Market Cap Bet". I cannot say "when", but everyone has been warned and the prescient should - at the very least - take the opportunity to hedge hedge hedge.

Monday, April 16, 2007

That IMF Statement in Full


Regarding the recent IMF meeting, the member representatives wish to issue the following joint communique statement to the Press.

For Immediate Release.

"I SEE NOTHING....I SEE NOTHING.....!"

Wednesday, April 11, 2007

So Long Reversion


In an April 10th research report, Daiwa's numerical gurus Yoshino and Sagawa wrote the epithet for naive price reversion strategies in the Japanese equity market. That price reversion has been the mainstay of many a naive arbitrageur in Japan from the bubble to the depths and back is noteworthy, though official pronouncements a brokerage firm of anything that reduces customers' trading turnover is rare to say the least. But Mssr's Yoshino and Sagawa have - up until now - been doing nice work, so their research, if nothing else, should be weighed carefully.

Their preamble summarizing the literature and history is coherent enough. And their gross numbers, while pathetically inadequate DO mirror the general condition of naive reversion, highlighting in particular the dearth of return since 2002. And while they arrive at a possible replacement in the form of a simple sector reversion model, it's paltry return is in all likelihood not robust to transactions costs and security borrowing limitations.

But in my mind, they fail to address the most nagging question of all: Why should reversion have persisted in Japan, contravening the normative behaviour of return persistence patterns highlighted by Jegadeesh in the US, and replicated by others for virtually all other global equity markets? For in even weakly efficient markets, BOTH naive reversion AND naive momentum shouldn't exist. Nonetheless, it [reversion] did, and rather than mourn and eulogize its passing, researchers with any sense of curiousity should set to work on why it was, historically speaking, so omnipresent.

Thursday, April 05, 2007

Sordid Business of Predicting A Crash (con't)


Kurtosis in the daily cross section of US equity returns is as elevated and extended as it has every been, YET the skewness remains highly positive, a truly anomalous circumstance. Historically, this has reliably foretold something ominous to come. Today, in answering the question I posed and whose answer I hinted at in my early March post of similar namesake, I will reveal why this happenstance exists. The answer is: "Private Equity".

Collectively, they [private equity], and the speculators who move security prices on the basis of rumours surrounding "who's next", are the ones responsible for the positively-signed, bountiful premiums, gapping certain stocks in the distribution higher in relation to the the rest of the distribution, which only inches forward. And as Stephen Ratner forthrightly said in his Bloomberg interview detailed below, they [his own private equity firm, Quadrangle] will continue to take things private so long as liquidity is abundant AND lenders are willing to buy debt at rates and on terms that, as Ratner says, make little economic sense from the perspective of the lender.

So in itself, the higher moments of the US equity market are whispering "bubble", though the bubble is seemingly located in the credit markets, with the equity market but a reflection thereof. This doesn't leave equity markets free and clear by any stretch of the imagination, for the chain of dependencies and linkages are many and complex, but it does explain the highly unusual circumstances of the higher moments. And by explaining away the fragile state of the higher moments, it perhaps takes the heat off of a collapse based upon unsustainable speculative internals, and pushes it towards the exogenous sustainability of the credit markets' extreme generosity and munificence.

Historically they have been related, and, as such such, the higher moments of the US equity market may themselves be the tell-tale of the bell-ringing ebullience of us dollar-based credit markets.

Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Wood to BOJ : Normalize now!!

In a Bloomberg news report today, CLSA's iconoclastic forecaster extratrordinaire, Christopher Wood & Lombard Street's esteemed Brian Reading, are reported to have called upon the BOJ to normalize rates. Contrary to most neo-mercantilist apologists who worry about the possible entrenchment of pernicious deflation (vs. the logically and naturally occuring benign type witnessed in Japan over the past decade and a half), the duo suggest that normalizing rates will INCREASE consumption, buoy financial sector earnings and property prices, and set Japan on the road to retail recovery.

Having not seen my own copy of "Fear & Greed" yet, I am relying on Bloomberg's report that Wood doesn't expect this anytime over the next three months. Needless to say, I agree on all accounts, but have a more cynical and more Machiavellian view on BoJ intransigence which is that it is NOT the result of conservative policy error, but rather, the lynchpin in a well-honed trade & industrial policy that is intent on retaining all commercial advantage for its enterprises visa-vis both its customers and its primary east-Asian competitors.

I would so love to see the bar-room brawl between chief apologist Stanford's Prof MacKinnon, and the pragmatic and experienced prognosticator, Mr Wood, though, like BoJ policy, we are unlikely to witness this event any time in the next three months.

Thursday, March 15, 2007

Where are all the Jewish Momentum Investors?

Many would find financial research a curious pursuit. And while most curious financial researchers have their own peculiar or arcane interests, one area of modern finance continues to intrigue and mystify me: "Why are there so few Jewish momentum investors?" Now before the ADL or JDL launches protest a to Blogger's management taking issue with this post before giving it a fair read, let me first clarify several points at the risk of spoiling my punchline. Firstly, by way of full disclosure, I have strong affiliations with the Tribe itself (of Abraham that is) - and little to no affiliation with the Church of Serial Correlation, the Cult of Momentum, or The Turtle Traders). Secondly, despite the fact that I am an unashamed peacenik, frequent critic of Likud, and an admirer of famous Israeli's such as Amos Oz, Y. Rabin, D. Barenboim and Y. Beilin, I AM an admirer of both the Jewish faith, and some of the things Israel has accomplished. This qualified and tepid opinion, however, does NOT - I repeat does NOT - in any way whatsoever make me anti-semitic. Thirdly, and contrary to your suspicions, the accompanying image, as any native from Calgary might tell you, strangely enough has nothing to do with the Star of David, or Momentum. It is in fact a sheriff's badge presumably labelled to express disaffection over the "mess" and chaos their annual rodeo-related Stampede creates. But it does a nice job of visually marrying my seemingly unrelated subjects.

Having dispensed with formalities and belied critics who might impugn my creditibility based upon THEIR politics, I will return to subject: the dearth of Jewish momentum traders. This puzzle initially gestated from meditations regarding the relative contribution of nature vs. nurture upon one's political beliefs. Proposing too much nature, it seems, is a contentious thought to some folk as I've discovered, for after espousing it, I've had people look upon me as puzzled and suspicious as if I were Kim Jong-Il doing a Liza Minelli impersonation, even though it's a quite innocuous observation. It goes like this. Based upon keen but anecdotal observation, populations seem to have roughly similar distributions of political archetypes between what one might broadly categorize as "progressive" or "conservative", irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or nationality of the entire population. Whether it's exemplied by Republican or Democrat, Labour or Conservative, Social Democrat or Christian Democrat there seems to be a rough equivalency in the percentages of these divisions in society. This seems to hold even if the specific ideological anchors have different coordinates in the political spectrum in different places. As other personality traits such as optimism and empathy have been shown to be strongly influenced by genetic predisposition, my probably unoriginal hypothesis by way of extension was quite simply: Why not politics? Perhaps everyone is born with a certain greater or lesser predispositon towards progressivity or conservatism, which themselves are possibly based a general affinity towards being receptive of, and embracing change (in the case of the progressive), or being cautious and suspicious of said change (as befits the conservative). The resulting conclusion: people underestimate the role of such genetic predisposition in political belief structures, in general, and in their own idelogical make-up in particular. While I am not an anthropologist nor a sociologist there are many examples of similar less-than-physical pre-disposed traits in relatively consistent proportions across varied populations (e.g. homosexuality). And while learned people who have studied this are not necessarily in agreement as to which competing theory best explains WHY the phenomena exists, there is little disgreement over the existence of the objective phenomena itself. This is NOT meant to disavow or diminish the influence of nurture, or to discount free will of the spirit which both have a role. But it is interesting, if not uncomfortable, to speculate that we may not be as free as we would like to believe.

Teleport now to the floor of the CBOT or the CBOE where mixed amongst the overly tall brokers are traders and speculators of many persuasions. Scalpers, market-makers, front-runners, discretionary liquidity providers, strategic traders, trend traders, and counter-trend traders, some disciplined, some emotional some visceral or instinctive. But here too there seems to be a similar archetypical personality divisions: that of the "trend-trader" or "counter-trend trader". One can also think of it as momentum-oriented or reversion oriented (or short-premium option traders vs long-premium option traders for our derivative friends). Might not genetic predisposition have a similar role in whether one felt more comfortable "riding a trend" or "or trying to anticipate a reversal"? Or in "buying a breakout" or "fading a pop"?? Or "Buying growth" or "buying value"? After all, these dichotomies are essentially attributable to the inherent optimism vs pessimism, or safety vs. adventuresomeness which we already have good reasons to believe are strongly influenced by nature.

Whether one agrees or not at this point, I hope you'll see a consistency and logic to this thread so far, that, if not probable, is at least plausible. Now comes the puzzle: if the general population consists of some relatively consistent distribution of, for simplicity's sake, "momentum-traders" and "reversion traders", why does there seem to be such an asymmetrical distribution specifically amongst the Jews? It's certainly not for lack of prowess at making money. Trading is in our blood and has been since our days refueling camels at the Judean cross-roads of civilisation. As a tribe, we account for some of the greatest value investors, but we seemingly can't ride a trend. Even Sol Waksal for example, whose company has the ultimate momentum theme - a cure for cancer, felt compelled to trade his position lest it's value be [temporarily] knocked by some petty little FDA concerns about experimental design. Few would argue that we are over-represented in the world of arbitrage, but under-represented amongst the great CTA's. Or that we have a keen eye for spotting and picking up the four-cent nickels, but have more difficulty sticking around to turn $1 dollar in $10. I could be way off base, but I think there is a pattern here. Is it something peculiar to "us" or is there something about momentum? Maybe it's just the "feel of it"? Or maybe it's the risk vs. reward proposition that is intuitively (or objectively) unappetizing? Or perhaps momentum requires something more of the mind or spirit, something that we simply cannot give?

It would be useful at this stage to better define "momentum". Though I am no expert on the subject, it may be helpful to separate it into different categories. One is "naive momentum" which is quite simply using past returns to predict the future direction of returns. "What's gone up will keep going up". What is outperforminmg will (hopefully) keep outperforming. For academics analyzing the stock market's cross-section of returns, this phenomena is typically viewed as relative in nature, or normalized performance ranks. Through this lens, persistence in relative return has been found to exist for as yet undiscovered and undiscernible reasons, confounding theorists - especially those espousing market efficiency. But the real Momentum-Men (and they ARE men as not a single famous woman springs to mind), are the practitioners that call themselves "trendfollowers" and would perceive themselves as more sophisticated and discriminating than the naive crowd. Here, simple moving averages give way to complex pattern matching techniques and endlessly catalogued contingency tables - all integrated systematically to find the holy financial grail which will allow them to distill the real trend that has the higher probability of persisting and thus being the motherlode that will take an ounce of gold that broke out from $454 to the stratospheric price of $5,000/oz (or beyhond!). This is a periodically prerequisite necessary to pay for for all the shakeouts, false starts, and ubiquitious reversals that are the by-product of the financial equivalent of chaos. That a number of practitioners have been reasonably (if not fabulously) successful employing these methods would seem to indicate that one dismisses them at their peril. Yet, others employing quite similar methods have crashed and burned spectacularly. But there is no shame in making (and losing) a fortune, for aside from being an adventure, it generates notoriety. And with such fame (infamy might be more accurate), one can always write a book, or post his musings on a website, or teach others to trade using trend-following techniques (but hopefully a more complete set than they used - one that incorporates counter-measures against periodically going nuclear). But perhaps the most amusing description of something with momentum was by Leif Ericson (on Peter Greenfinch's website) which he posited "was the battle between those with more money than intelligence against those with more intelligence than money.

Indeed, momentum has its uses, and has made some people (particularly brokers and exchanges, as well as some investors and traders) fabulous amounts of money. But it's not for the faint-hearted, and not without large and attendant risks. But that still doesn't answer why Jews are under- or unrepresented here. What's preventing them from joining the search for the leprechaun with real potfulls of gold at the end of the rainbow for the lucky few?

For a start, it seems that being long momentum requires faith. Similar in nature to the good old-fashioned bible-thumping fire-breathing kind. But faith in what? It's difficult to say just what that something is, and theoreticians remain perplexed. One might say it's essentially faith that the future bias of returns will continue to resemble the past. But is this wise or even acurate? It's not a bad bet with respect to things like whether the sun will tomorrow, whether the leaves will turn color this autumn, or whether the government will suddenly feel geneorous and abolish tax. And it's not unreasonable have some more-then-ambivalent confidence in a directonal movement when something is converging towards some probable equilibria. But the odds and thus confidence intuitively diminsh as one moves farther from equilibria (assuming one has a reasonably accurate estimate of probable equilibria). Consequently, risk increases. By contrast, it is "doubt" which comes easy to us Jews. Faith comes much harder. We desire proof. We NEED proof. A Covenant, for example, would work well. As would a burning bush, or some directives or commandments carved in stone. Recall, God had to crack the whip many times before people were convinced. And it took lots of smiting. And even then, there was backsliding. Moses was skeptical at first and took multiple minor demonstrations of transmutation to convince him. And I would guess that when he took his demands to the Pharoah, he probably had his doubts. At least until Pharoah's kingdom was over-run by toads. That was his nature - to doubt.

Maybe we eschew Momentum because we're just contrarians? While it's true that we are always up for a good debate, it is unfair to say that we are contrarians for the sake of it or just for kicks. Having said that, one must remember that we are wary of crowds as historically, when we Jews have seen the crowd coming, it was time to leave. And fast. Over the generations it's become burnished in our minds. But suspicion of the herd is not pathological. When there is sale on, we are the first to queue up and often lead the stampede. No obvious contrarianism there. And one must not forget that the God of the old testament is severe. He can (and often did) take away what he'd bestowed, not to mention the ever-present threat of smiting. Momentum needs time, and these things in combination have always made time an issue for us which, while it makes us good bankers, does put some behavioural boundaries upon our holding period. The old saw "One in the hand is worth more than two in the bush", would take on special meaning if one not might be around to collect.

Jews are studious, value education, and usually pretty rigorous. The faith required of a momentum investor resembles closing one's eyes when taking risk. We are used to and not shy of taking risks, but they are typially calculated risks. Like the risk of taking that "Home Office Deduction" against our income tax. We can do the math. But we disapprove of pure gambles. When was the last time you a saw one of our tribe win a large Pick-6 jackpot?!? Or when was the last time your Jewish friend invited you to go the racetrack, or wager on the greyhounds? We intuitively know lotteries are poor odds. That's why when we went to Vegas, we would rather "be the house" and "be paid" than "pay the house" and be played. When we do go to casinos as a customer its for the free drinks, and not for thrill of trying our luck against the odds. We prefer investment to speculation. At least with an investment, one can estimate probabilities and calculate expected returns. And hedge. Only then do we pray. And when we pray, we pray to God not for "good luck" but rather that the hedge holds.

Without being disparaging, momentum is useful as a discipline for people who have no other. And some form of discipline is better than none. We've an inherent intellectual flexibility which in investment terms is important in order to integrate new information and fight against hard-to-overcome cognitive biases. Maybe that's because we've always been moving and have had to learn the ways of new people and places. Unlike the way many conservative strict-constructionists in America prefer an ossified constituition, or the way fundamentalists of all religious persuasions strictly interpret their religious texts, Jews are constantly re-examing and re-interpreting the meaning of their scripture (amongst other things). Trend-following is a disciplined system that proxies for intelligence-derived flexibility. It dictates change in response to something, even if that something is facile, and often ill-logical, and frequently uneconomic. Our nature results in a demanding need to know "why" and to reach our conclusions by way of intellect, rather than faith. This creates decision flexibility (to react to, or incorporate change) which inhibits belief anchoring without sacrificing understanding.

Or perhaps we're just not optimistic enough to "close our eyes and buy"? It seems that most momentum traders are optimists by nature. Optimistic in their belief market solutions are always better. In conservative republicanism. In low taxes. I would not deny the suggestion that as a people we are not renown for our positivism. Not in art, literature, nor psychiatry. But in finance, optimism is independant of, and should not be confused with, monentum. Sometimes there is good reason to be optimistic about the direction of price movement, and sometimes not. And while I would agree that optimism serves many useful functions in the human struggle for survival, it's been shown by researchers that pessimists perception of objective reality is in fact closer to objective reality. Optimism is an important tool in sports, healing the mind and spirit or achieving personal goals, but it cannot and will not move market prices. Full stop. Objective reality (or at least reasonably accurate perception of reality), on the other hand, is extremely useful and of paramount importance when assessing probabilties, making expected return calculations, or discerning the sign and location of the fat tail..

What is the final take-away? Though untested, and unproven, the asymmetry seems to result from an unusually strong combination of natural predisposition towards progressivity inherent in our genes coupled with a multitude of social nurture factors eminating from our idiosyncratic history, religion and culture, all which reinforce our predilection for value and the counter-trend. This is not to discount the potential contributions momentum can make. But that doesn't mean we have to like it, or for that matter, pursue it, which in aggregate, we apparently don't. After all, no one really "likes" insurance, but we still buy it....

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Quote of the Day

Steven Rattner, former Lazard co-hort of Felix Rohatyn, general all-around straight-shooting good-guy, and in his spare time working for the home team (or at least the lesser of the evils, politically) now Chief Buyout Honcho at his own shop, Quadrangle, spoke to Bloomberg News in an interview today, and said:
"there may be a change, that this gushing well of liquidity that we've all enjoyed for the past several years now is coming to an end.
He continued that it's hard to tell precisely if its now for certain, and that for the moment, it seems to be contained. Then, in a moment of clarity and forthright honesty for which I most admire him, he went on (and it's verbatim):
Our view for some time has been that we are in a credit bubble and that there is money being lent and that we're happily borrowers of it on the private equity side at rates and on terms that really frankly don't make a great deal of sense from the standpoint of the lenders...but we're the borrowers, and we're happy to take advantage of that, and so as long as we can continue to finance our deals with that money, we will continue to do it."
What can one say, but, "a fool and his money [lent fixed, for too long, too cheap, and on shitty terms] are soon parted"...

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

The Sordid Business of Predicting A Crash

First let me state that I am patently NOT in the business of prognosticating stock crashes. That said, please allow me to forecast one that, against all good, common sense, I believe, may be coming to a bourse near to you rather soon, in perhaps the next 30 to 40 trading days. And I say "good, common sense" because statistically predicting crashes is, for those who pursue it, a truly rotten profession. Far more difficult than trying to predict, say a "0" or "00" on the spin of roulette wheel (at a mere 1-in-37). It is more akin to 1-in-120 call, AT BEST, and perhaps a 1-in-500 or even 1-in-1000 longshot-of-a-call at worst, assuming of course that I do not need to accurately flag the precise day, but or days, but only the general vicinity in time.

Surely you will ask "why" I have embarked upon so ludicrous and statistically unrequited and unrewarding a path. The first reason in all honesty is that since I am not paid for this forecast, I cannot be fired for being wrong. Second, because I am master of my own fate, and because I am rather reasonably hedged and crash-neutral insofar as market exposure is concerned in my professional portfolios, I needn't worry about firing myself, for being wrong. Third, IF as a result of this rather bold and outlandish prediction, I turn out to be correct, then I shall have no problem (with all of my readers' testaments in hand), in pursuing a new (and leisurely!!) career as an ‘Investment Letter Writer’, one that I can pursue from a suitably comfortable location, be it surf-side or slope-side (for which the prices of said bricks & mortar will - no doubt - be dramatically reduced in the event).

The more skeptical amongst you will no doubt endeavor to ask, what manner of evidence I might possess to back up this apparently farcical and visceral hunch. And here, I will reveal to you, that which is of true value. It is not a secret of dark magic or of statistical smoke & mirrors, though it is somewhat obscure, and off the beaten path of ordinary observers. For "it" is buried deep in the cross-section of the distribution of stock-market returns, in particular, within the higher moments, which, I would hold out to my readers, have a remarkable tendency to (historically speaking) whisper things that are terribly important, be it "danger" or "opportunity".

To be more specific, I am referring to the cross-sectional skewness of daily returns in the investable portion of the US equity market, and, even more precisely, a three-month moving average of such a measure, systematically removing of course, the most extreme daily observations. Typically, this measure tends to have a negative sign, which if my feeble knowledge of statistics serves me right, implies that the associated tail risk of the distribution sports a negative sign, in relation to the average daily return (which has incidentally over the past 25 years typically been (small) positive. The kurtosis then, a sensitive cubed measure, relates to us just how far from the mean that [usually] negative tail lies. Periodically, in the US, this measure of cross-sectional skewness of returns climbs to positive territory, and, on a few even rarer occasions, the departure into the positive is rather greater and more elongated than at others. These, historically speaking, have coincided with, or presaged significant market events.

On some occasions (as one might expect), such a flip-flop into a state of highly elevated positive skewness has FOLLOWED extreme corrections such as those seen in the Aug through October period in 1987, the May through early October period in 1998, or the June 2002-> March 03 capitulation of the NASDAQ. On such occasions, it has been a benign signpost of recovery, signaling what momentum traders term: a breakout, or trend-continuation, of sorts. This is intuitive since, following a grand capitulation, with the veil of fear and uncertainty is lifted, gaps to the upside, recovering earlier losses, are unsurprising and tend towards continuation. Such moves are typically consistent with, and converge towards, some future sustainable intermediate-term equilibrium rather than away from it.

On other occasions however, such positive skewness periodically follows elongated positive return runs that resembles something like a melt-up. At such times, positive returns perhaps have induced panic buying, or panic short-covering that causes the tail-risk to have - at these instances – an uncommonly positive sign. Such was the case in April to August run-up in 1987, the second quarter of 1998, the fourth quarter of 1999 into the beginning of the year, and, yes, mid-February 2007. In fact, mid-February 2007 saw the most elevated measures seen I’ve seen in the US market since my data for this commences 25 years ago. Now I’ll admit that these may not be apples-to-apples comparisons since the nature and number of listings in the “investable” cross-section has changed over time, but nonetheless, the elevation recently witnessed is, in a single word, unprecedented.

None of this will escape practitioners, who can see it and smell it in the trenches, perhaps using other technical descriptive terminology or endogenous market indicators, but it is, nonetheless an additional systematic tell-tale, less commonly observed by most. Now add to this a kurtosis measure of the same cross-sectional returns. Somewhat expectedly, during selective panics, (for example the 2002 tech-wreck), skewness is highly negative, and kurtosis is highly elevated signaling a negative tail well-departed from the mean. During 1987, by contrast, or September 11th, the crashes were rather more democratic, and while skewness was negative, kurtosis was not nearly as elevated as at other times of less-universal panic. For during a crash the average return tends to be rather negative, with the tail not too far off the mean, as correlations tend to converge. Importantly, at both “significant tops” AND recovery rallies, kurtosis is typically diminished, or at a local minima. This may reflect investor behavioural preferences to take profits on large the positive tail, but it nonetheless has a subduing effect in keeping the tail closer to the mean on those occasions when the skewness does turn positive. Yet again, in mid-February, somewhat unprecedentedly, we have witnessed very elevated positive skewness AND reasonably elevated kurtosis. In my experience, this is twilight-zone stuff. All we need now is Rod Serling to tell us what it means.

My take is as follows: we are at a monumental turning point in America’s twenty-five year experiment in leverage, and systemic speed bump in Bretton Woods II. We are seeing the telltales of a liquidity-induced blow-off that’s been fueled by ever-easier credit and nearly free-money that - up until now - has fed nominal earnings growth, but that is on the cusp of rolling over, on many and diverse fronts due to systemic contradictions, inconsistencies and imbalances. Yet some high-rollers awash with investable funds and brass cojones seem to be betting that even more liquidity (the Fed "put", Bernanke's helicopter, whatever) will be thrown at it by authorities, that will assuage any drop in nominal prices. AND they must also believe that this liquidity, like that which has been thrown at markets since 2002, will continue NOT to spike rates, and NOT to puke the USD, and NOT cause the ire of Pelosi and her labour constituents, and so not fan inflation but further fuel yet another bout of asset price spirals such as those seen in commodities, stocks, Art, REITs, Credit Spreads, beachfront property, wine, Chelsea homes, and the famous Honus Wagner T205 baseball card. The era of risk anaesthitization is ending.

Understand, I am not a bear looking for an excuse to be bearish. Rather, I am looking at an indicator of an unusually rare market occurance, searching for an explanation, whose more plausible answer is pointing towards something eventful, with returns that are likely to be more volatile, and with a greater frequency of negative signs than those witnessed in the preceding four years. As an immediate forecaster of things bad, I must admit to being unnerved by the post-hiccup jack-in-the-box company of Mssrs. Faber, Edwards, and Tice, irrespective of their esteemed and cogent analyses. But IF the whispers of "the higher moments" again prove prescient, it is highly likely that the brief turbulence witnessed last week is but a proverbial “shot across the bow” presaging an episodic fit that will - in hindsight - be measured in months, and nominal losses into measured into double-digits.

Monday, March 12, 2007

Sub-Prime Poetry v1.0

So Farewell
then
New Century
Financial.
You're implied yield
was 452.38%
before
it was ZERO.

You lent
to those who
might not be able
to pay.
And they
Didn't.

The Laws
of prudent
lending, were,
one presumes,
apparently
were not so
NEW.

(with apologies to EJ Thribb)

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

ClineSpeak

Bloomberg's Tom Keene stewarded a nice interview with the eminent Dr. William Cline, now Senior Fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and whose textbook on International Monetary Policy, incidentally, was cornerstone of my course work on the subject in the early 1980s.

His main points (though nothing new), were nice to hear as they were realyed in the most sober and un-hysterical of terms:

* The current path of US deficits is clearly unsustainable. If left uchecked. modelling US ratio of debt to GDP will tend towards 140% in the following decade. It needs to stabilize at nearer to 50% to have any chance of intermediate term sustainability.

* This will necessarily require a cut in the CA deficit, to at least 3% of GDP from current 7% levels.

* In the modelling the policy outcomes required to get there, the US will also need flatten the fiscal gap to zero, perhaps even running a mild fiscal surplus, from currently yawning levels.

How does th US achieve these goals?

* Reversing Bush tax cuts will only get the US fiscal gaps to the -2 to -3% level, though mounting intergenerational liabilities will require further fiscal action and measures on reveues, spending, or both.

* USD must continue to depreciate on the order of another 15 - 20%. Asian nations, in general, must allow their currencies to rise. Japanese YEN should be in the vicinity of 90; and the RmB too, should be substantially higher. I could detect (like my own opinion) a rather scathing tone towards Japanese intransigence YEN appreciation.

* To avoid a meaningfully hard and rapid crisis-induced adjustment, participants probably should enact and abide by a new Plaza-like Accord whereby participants agree NOT to intervene in FX markets; NOT to accumulate reserves for mercantile advantage; and let the markets tend towards natural adjustment. Failure to due so will inevitably spawn more a meaningful adjustment crisis.

* He was rather disturbed by the fact that current adjustment requirements (even today) are more demanding than historical ones, YET policy-makers remain sanguine, and wholly unmotivated to seek multilateral solutions.

I would add, almost needless to say, that all plausible solutions are contractionary, whether undertaken sooner or later. The earlier they are implemented, the more likely that recovery benefits from a lower currency and lower rates will feed through to cushion the overdue adjustment.

Aesop Revisited

(the following joke that I'd like to share was e-mailed to me by a perceptive Swedish friend, its ultimate attribution which cannot be established, so apologies in advance to its pithy author for any copyright transgressions.

A Japanese company (Toyota) and an American company (General Motors) decided to have a canoe race on the Missouri River. Both teams practiced long and hard to reach their peak performance before the race. On the big day, the Japanese team won by a mile.

The Americans, very discouraged and depressed, decided to investigate the reason for the crushing defeat. A management team made up of senior executives was formed to investigate and recommend appropriate action. Their conclusion was the Japanese team had 8 people rowing and 1 person steering, while the American team had 8 people steering and 1 person rowing.

So American management hired a consulting company and paid them a large amount of money for a second opinion. They advised that too many people were steering the boat, while not enough people were rowing. To prevent another loss to the Japanese, the American's rowing team's management structure was totally reorganized to 4 steering supervisors, 3 area steering superintendents and 1 assistant superintendent steering manager. They also implemented a new performance system that would give the 1 person rowing the boat greater incentive to work harder. It was called the "Rowing Team Quality First Program," with meetings, dinners and free pens for the rower. There was discussion of getting new paddles, canoes and other equipment, extra vacation days for practices, and bonuses.

The next year the Japanese won by two miles. Humiliated, the American management laid off the rower for poor performance, halted development of a new canoe, sold the paddles, and canceled all capital investments for new equipment. The money saved was distributed to the Senior Executives as bonuses and the next year's racing team was outsourced to India.

Monday, March 05, 2007

Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro

There is the wonderful scene in the "Life of Brian" where our hero is caught by a Roman sentry (played by John Cleese) writing anti-Imperial slogans on the wall, and, rather than being hauled away is professorily corrected, and made to write it ad infinitum, all over the walls of the plaza.

Thinking of our recently-humbled carry traders, perhaps a similar exercise is in order. Now repeat after me:


Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.
Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro.

(and so on....)


Literal translation: A greedy mind is satisfied with no (amount of) gain